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our Asian partners in the Western Pacific. The study also shows that as easily 
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regions of the world. It shows why flotilla ships have a combat advantage in the missile 
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crisis with China or for war. The purposes range from serving as “coast watcher” 
monitoring stations to basing semi-covert, hard to attack land-to-sea missiles. Flotilla and 
Marine outpost functions are expected to be mutually reinforcing. The outposts may 
serve to prevent Chinese occupation of strategic or economically valuable offshore 
locations in the East and South China Seas. The study also shows how the flotilla can 
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Under no circumstances [should] big ships become big or expensive in 
equipment to the extent that their defense becomes a first priority 
requirement in itself. This would inevitably negate their offensive value. 
          Rear Admiral Benyamin Telem, Israeli Defense Force (IDF)1 
A. STUDY PURPOSE AND CONTENTS 
A workshop sponsored by the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment 
on retaining American influence in East Asia led to a report published in October 2011.2 
The workshop participants advocated four force elements to reduce the chance of Chinese 
aggression and a shooting war. One component is a flotilla of small, highly lethal 
combatants that can be sent on the surface into the China Seas. Analysis at the  
Naval Postgraduate School and war gaming at the Naval War College independently saw 
the potential of such low-cost missile combatants and the need for a more detailed 
examination, since no such capability exists in the U. S. Navy. 
Our purpose is to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of a flotilla of such small 
combatants, specifically in East Asia, but also in the Persian Gulf and in other cul de sacs 
around the world such as the Black and Baltic Seas, and Eastern Mediterranean. We 
address costs, logistics, supporting reconnaissance, and tactical adaptability. We show 
how the flotilla adds additional strategic choices in a flexible strategy to influence China, 
especially when positioned at Marine outposts located along the First Island Chain in a 
mutually reinforcing and interlocking system. 
The study’s emphasis is on operations and tactics. These are so multifaceted that 
no simple campaign analysis can adequately represent the several considerations or 
answer all questions pertaining to the flotilla. Nor can the historical record add much, 
because our navy has not fought a battle at sea since 1945. This is the penalty of success, 
because for 75 years the American Navy’s superiority has not been tested. Quite 
instructive is the similar nineteenth century Pax Britannica, aided by the Royal Navy’s 
supremacy at sea from 1815 to the rise of Imperial Germany and its High Seas Fleet, 
circa 1910. Between 1815 and 1890 a great technological transformation occurred in 
battle fleets that went untested until the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, and  
Russo-Japanese Wars. The absence of tests at sea during the 75-year Pax Americana has 
similarly limited the U. S. Navy’s sea battle experience and skills. Like the Royal Navy 
before World War I, we have had to observe missile warfare conducted by other nations 
and learn vicariously. 
“The flotilla” first came to prominence at the beginning of the twentieth century in 
the form of deadly torpedo boats, submarines, and mines. Battleships that ventured into 
littoral waters paid a dreadful penalty, notably illustrated by the loss of three of them and 
                                                 
1 Benyamin Telem, Naval Lessons of the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv, Israel: University Publishing 
Projects, 1975). 
2 Wayne Hughes, “Report of a Workshop on Retaining Influence in the Western Pacific, 24-25 August 
2011,” Naval Postgraduate School, Technical Report, NPS-OR-11-006, October 2011. 
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a battlecruiser to mines in March 1915 in the Dardanelles. In 1898, the great Russian 
Admiral, S. O. Makarov, himself soon to die when his battleship struck a mine and sank 
off Port Arthur in 1905, wrote with droll wit: 
Up to the present [command of the sea] has been understood to mean that the fleet 
commanding the sea openly plies upon it and the beaten antagonist does not dare to 
leave his ports. Would this be so today? Instructions bearing on the subject counsel 
the victor to avoid night attack from the torpedo boats of the antagonist . . . [I]f the 
matter were represented to a stranger he would be astonished. He would probably 
ask whether he properly understood that a victorious fleet must protect itself from 
the remnant of a vanquished enemy.3 
Thus, the first reason for an American flotilla is to fight symmetrically against small 
combatants where big ships should not go, in the waters off a coastline cluttered with 
fishing boats, coastal traffic, oil rigs, islands, inlets, and estuaries.4 Such a flotilla ensures 
that we need not cede the littoral waters to an enemy equipped and trained to operate 
there. 
The second reason small missile combatants have come into prominence is the 
success of small warships with lethal salvoes fired at large ships. The first salvoes were 
with torpedoes. Then, starting with the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by the Soviet-
built Osas and Komars in 1967, the salvoes became cruise missiles and navies entered the 
missile age of warfare. 
The third reason was that it took only one or two hits from a salvo of either 
torpedoes or cruise missiles to put a large warship out of action. In fact, the weight of 
ordnance to put a warship out of action increases only as the one-third power of its 
displacement, making smaller missile ships a cost-effective offensive capability. In other 
words, the historical evidence is that if a 300-foot ship will be put out of action by a 
certain kind of missile or quantity of ordnance, then it takes only three hits with the same 
missile or three times the ordnance to incapacitate a 900-foot ship.5 
B. STUDY STRUCTURE 
Because no sea campaigns have been fought since the Falklands War in 1982, 
Chapter I will illustrate the advantages of a flotilla with an imaginary modern battle 
fought in the Mediterranean. It shows how a battle is tied to and complicated by strategy 
and national policy. In the example, the national command authority wishes to avoid 
strikes on land, since that would surely expand the war. Instead, the U. S. President wants 
to resolve the crisis with shooting limited to the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. 
                                                 
3 S. O. Makarov, Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics, 1898, republished in the Classics of Sea 
Power Series by the Naval Institute Press, 1990, where the quotation is on page 28. 
4 We define littoral waters nontechnically, but visualizably as “where the clutter is.” 
5 For detailed wartime data see R. L. Humphrey, “Comparing Damage and Sinking Data for World War 
II and Recent Conflicts,” presented to the 13th General Working Meeting of The Military Conflict Institute, 
McLean, VA, October 1992; T. R. Beall, “The Development of a Naval Battle Model and Its Validation 
Using Historical Data,” Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA, 1990; and  
John C. Shulte, “An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Antiship Cruise Missiles in Littoral 
Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s Thesis, September 1994, Monterey, CA. Their results and 
other data are summarized in Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2000), 156–164. Most of the data is taken from World War II battles, when much attention 
and construction costs went into staying power as armor, compartmentation, and system redundancy. 
 xi 
In the mythical scenario, that is the problem that the tactical commander must solve with 
a diminished Sixth Fleet. To do so, he needs a flotilla of small combatants. 
Shifting from complex to simple exposition, Chapter II first describes 
quantitatively the advantages of small combatants acting in concert. Then, we summarize 
the historical record of over 200 antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) fired in combat at sea 
to show their effects in the missile age. With one exception, the battle venues were all in 
littoral waters, the attacks were carried out either by aircraft or relatively small 
combatants, and the ships that successfully defended themselves employed means other 
than surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 
Chapter III describes the role of the flotilla in a U. S. war-at-sea strategy, which 
threatens to create a “no man’s sea” in China’s home waters. We draw from three rich 
papers, one of which felicitously calls the war-at-sea strategy “offshore control.” We 
describe how the quick-reaction insertion of Marines in outposts along the first island 
chain can support, and be supported by, the flotilla and forestall their occupation by 
China. Such a Marine/flotilla presence together can serve as a powerful constraint on 
Chinese threats to our allies and partners in the South and East China Seas. 
Having described the roles of a flotilla, in Chapter IV we introduce illustrative 
missile ship characteristics and a tentative flotilla composition, while showing the very 
modest cost to build it. Two short paragraphs state that the austerely manned flotilla ships 
are not cutting edge, but remedial. Future flotillas will blend small, manned, missile 
combatants with even smaller, unmanned vessels in greater numbers, just as is already 
happening in the aircraft and undersea communities. 
In Chapter V, we review four pertinent periods of salvo warfare, in 1942, 1971, 
1973, and 1982. We amplify Chapter I’s “Battle of the Aegean” and further discuss what 
contemporary littoral combat would be like. We describe the current trends and processes 
of missile warfare. We contrast two different employments of the flotilla in the China 
Seas, first for peacetime influence and, second, in a time of conflict. 
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 1 
I. AN IMAGINARY CONFLICT 
A navy’s purposes deal with the movement and delivery of goods and 
services at sea; an army’s purpose is to purchase and hold real estate. 
Thus a navy is in the links business, while an army is in the  
nodes business. 
       Wayne P. Hughes, 
Jr.6 
A. SOME BACKGROUND FROM REAL NAVAL WARFARE 
Seventy years ago, the U. S. Navy became aircraft carrier and submarine centric. Carrier 
task forces plus submarines—acting independently or in wolf packs—had grown in 
importance after World War I. Simultaneously, the “flotilla” was distinguished by 
leading strategists, like Sir Julian Corbett, as an entirely different fleet component, 
distinct in function and capabilities from capital ships that gained command of the high 
seas, and submarines that conducted a guerre de course against shipping. 7  Surface 
combatants were mere “escorts” of carriers, amphibious ships, the combat logistics force, 
and vital shipping. Exceptions were destroyers that performed in the flotilla role, most 
prominently for eighteen months in the Solomon Islands campaign of 1942-43.8 The 
carrier and submarine emphasis was natural because in World War II they were by far the 
most effective in sinking enemy warships and merchant vessels. But the U. S. and 
Japanese Navy destroyers were irreplaceable in the restricted waters off Guadalcanal and 
then up “The Slot” in the central Solomons, because they could achieve surprise with a 
salvo of deadly torpedoes at close range, sacrificing themselves if need be. 
After World War II, the Soviet Union planned to challenge the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) vital use of the seas with submarines and land-based 
bombers. The first change to U. S. Navy roles came in the 1950s, when carriers 
surrendered half of their capital ship responsibilities to 41 SSBNs armed with Polaris 
medium-range, ballistic missiles. The second change, almost unnoticed in the U. S. Navy, 
came in the early 1970s, when air-, ship-, and land-launched missiles began to replace 
bombs or missiles delivered by aircraft. This was so because a big salvo of missiles could 
be launched from a large number of small warships and, after a few years of 
development, could reach just as far and accurately as naval aircraft that had to fly from 
a much smaller number of large aircraft carriers. 
Evidence from actual battles at sea after 1945, however, is sparse. From 1950 to 
the present, our Navy has been able to concentrate most of its efforts on projecting 
military power from sea to land and has done so with unrivalled success. In 1998, this 
study’s coauthor, Hughes, conceived and described an imaginary battle set in the eastern 
Mediterranean in order to illustrate features of modern missile combat. What follows is 
his description, found on pages 321–347 of Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat and 
                                                 
6 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Naval Institute Press: 2000), 9. 
7 See Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. First published in 1911, the pertinent discussion 
may be found at pp. 121–123 of the 1988 republication of this masterwork by the Naval Institute Press. 
8 PT Boats were employed there, too, but, for various reasons, had mixed results. 
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reproduced with permission of the Naval Institute Press. Although the book was 
published thirteen years ago, the vignette is remarkably relevant to East Asian  
waters today. 
B. THE BATTLE OF THE AEGEAN, 1998 
 
I closed the first edition of Fleet Tactics with a purely tactical nar-
rative, seen through the eyes of the victim. The purpose was to sug-
gest the properties of modern missile combat. "The Next Battle of 
the Nile" was going to take place on the 200th anniversary of Nel-
son's great victory on 1 August 1798. I take only pleasure in know-
ing that the battle between American and Soviet navies cannot take 
place. On the other hand, the tactical implications live on, and I 
would wish that the insights of the tale will survive the date of it, a~ 
George Orwell ·s cautionary story of totalitarianism has endured long 
past his famous book's date, 1984. 
The subject of this edition extends to the operational level and cam-
paigns in littoral waters. It is fitting to replace the tactical example 
with a scenario expanded to include a typically intricate crunpaign 
setting within which a commander must operate to achieve his tacti-
cal goal. I indulge in author's license to allow the tactical com-
mander of the first edition to reappear, this time as the operational 
commander. I need him again, for his skills are going to to be tested 
to the limit. Intended to illustrate tactical s implicity amid operational 
intricacy, my fable is fiction in that it is seen through a commander ·s 
eyes in order to flavor the problem with the human aspects of what 
we analysts sometimes reduce to mere cold calculation. It is f orecasr 
in its description of the modern tactical environment, dominated by 
sensors. missiles, and information operations, with undercurrents of 
torpedoes, mines, and amphibious operations. 
I confront my navy hero with the kind of operational problem an<l 
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tactical s ituation that the U .S. Navy will face when it is opposed by a 
respectable. integrated coastal defense, partly ship- and partly land-
based. To create suc h an enemy I have risked offending a friend of 
the United States and the American navy. I would wish that my ·'op-
ponent., sees the scenario as constructed for the sam e purpose that 
the U.S. Navy played its wargames against the British navy in the 
1920s. H e is chosen not because he is a likely foe but because hi s 
seaward-looking forces are a fonnidable test of the American navy 's 
tactics, syste ms, and doctrine. 
On the other hand, l am quite serious about one aspect of the sce-
nario not found in contemporary U.S. military planning. That is the 
possibility of a maritime campaign in which all the fighting is con-
fined to the seaward side of a coastline. The campaign is one in 
which any attempt to bring the whole weight of American military 
power to bear against the enem y homeland would be disastrously 
contrary to American interests . At the same time to allow the foe the 
unimpeded use of his home waters would be jus t as intolerable. The 
U.S . Navy must carry a m aritime campaign all the way to the enemy 
coast because the Unjted States is a maritime nation. 
The narrative shows the extent to which warfare in coastal waters 
requires tactics, doctrine. and combat systems substantially different 
from those of the American blue-water navy. By a combat system I 
mean ships, aircraft, and sensors all connected for unified action by 
information technology and combat doctrine. The successful inter-
weaving is to my mind the essence and intent of network centric war-
fare. At the same time the vignette is intended to show why an oppo-
nent who is fighting in his own waters does not need the same high 
technology to defend himself that we will need to penetrate his 
coastal defenses. Doctrine for semiautonomous operations combined 
with concealment and surprise will be sufficient for an enemy to 
challenge us to the utmost. Indeed, the circumstances facing m y 
hero. Admiral Grant. are so severe that I have had to give him some 
forces not now in the American navy. for I do not think Grant can 
meet ms challenge without them. 
Beyond those things. I d o not intend the tactics as lessons learned , 
except to illustrate that in combat the devil is in the de tails of the 
weapon~. sensors. and doctrine e mployed. For instance. an influen-
tial feature of the scenario will be that all three countries involved 
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have large numbers of Harpoon missiles. Another fundamental char-
acteristic is a variety of combatants srnaJJ enough to risk in combat. 
using networking to concentrate fire in time and space. Nuclear-
powered submarines are of little value at the climax. but they loom 
large at the onset of the crisis by playing their traditional role. Neither 
land- nor sea-based aircraft strikes contribute to the solution itself. 
but a perceptive reader will see that aircraft on both sides everywhere 
cast a long shadow over every tactical action. 
The Crisis 
Before him lies living proof. thinks Admiral Ulysses S. "Sam" Grant, 
that operations are more intricate than tactics. His battle plan de-
pends on reducing all considerations to a set of simple tactical ac-
tions that everyone understands well enough to carry out in the midst 
of the confusion and uncertainty of the impending fight. Bur the op-
erations now underway flow from layer on layer of national policy 
and military strategy. There will be a battle because of a sequence of 
deadly events that had not been pretty for the U.S. Navy. Sam Grant 
would give the battle his full and undivided attention soon. but first 
he goes over in his mind the multifaceted decisions that initiated the 
campaign now rushing to its climax. 
The setting embraces not two but three antagonists, as well as 
vested interests of every country in Europe and most in western Asia. 
There have been more Byzantine circumstances than those surround-
ing him, thinks Grant, but his a.re sufficiently convoluted to make it 
fitting that ancient Byzantium is no farther from him now than the far 
side of the Aegean Sea. His mission is to cool the passions of the two 
ancient antagonists on each side of it. 
Sam Grant's operational responsibility is to interpose between 
Turkey and Greece at this, the eleventh hour before all the dogs of 
war are unleashed. The United Stales· peacemaking endeavor i~ 
down to its last chance. a chance that rest~ on a battle by hi~ force~ 
alone. It is the American admiral's paradox that in order to restore 
peace he must shed blood. A battle is certain but the outcome is not. 
because the U.S. Sixth Fleet. unaided. faces the entire Turkish navy 
and more. Yet hi s battle plan can be successful because the mission 
is attainable by the tacticians under his command. With luck and skill 
and staunchness his forces will he just sufficient to the task. 1t is go-
 5 
 
ing to be the American navy's greatest challenge since the Battle of 
Midway. 
How Admiral Grant crun e to wear the mantle of a combat com-
mander is itself one of those mruvels of strategic intricacy. U.S. Grant 
is CINCUSNAVEUR. who until j ust three days ago was subordinate 
to the American theater commander in Europe, USCTNCEU R , the 
fom1idablc four-star General E. F. "Famous" Grouse, up no rth in 
land-locked Stuttgart, Germany. Grouse was no friend of Grant's; in 
h is mind al l military decisions worthy of the name resulted from ac-
tion on the ground. Yet after the opening violence, Grant found him-
self in command and taking orders directly from the secretary of de-
fense and chairman of the JCS . The president. in his de licate 
calibration of the politics of violence, is committed to succeed or fail 
w ith the Navy alone. Using the modest forces of the Sixth Fleet and 
without the full weight of Americru1 mig ht, Grant mus t bank the fires 
of the simmering feud between Turkey and Greece, so much in its 
passions like the ageless hatred between the Capulets and Mon-
tagues-or in Am erican in1agery. the Hatfields and M cCoys. 
In recent months Greek zealots fomented violence on Cyprus thar 
was beyond containmen t by the small UN pe ace keeping force. A 
week ago Greece used the violence as the reason to announce its in-
tentions to introduce theater ballistic missiles into the island. miss iles 
that in a matter of minutes could reach every vital center in Turkey. 
The Turkish populace was enraged. Uncharacteristically. the presi-
dent and prime minister of Turkey both supported the popular anger 
and nurtured the swelling de mand for action. As it came down to 
Grouse and Grant fron1 the CIA through the Joint Staff. Turkish 
forces were about to effect a strategy they had prepared should 
Greece ever act on its threat to move missiles into Cyprus. 
Publicly Turkey's minister of defense announced a quarantine to 
block the Greek movement to Cyprus by sea. Simultaneously. 
Turkey prepared to sail in force against Cyprus so ostentatiously that 
no official in Greece could fail to respond. For Turkey bad a deeper 
motive. Far to the east of Greece and tucked less than 100 miles 
away from the Turkish ma inland, Cyprus was bait in a trap. The 
G reek navy. support able only weakly by the Greek air force. which 
must fly to the end of its tether. would have to run a deadly gauntlet. 






/ \. ------ --.._____-.__/ 
(D Greece plans to move land-launched TBMs to Cyprus 
@Turkey announces intention to move major forces into 
Cyprus, and then 
® Crush the Greek navy 
Greek Intentions and Turkish Response 
missiles were poised to fight a littoral war that was vastly in Turkey·s 
favor. As the climax and conclusion of phase one in Turkey's cam-
paign plan, a fleet action was planned west of Cyprus which would 
reduce the Greek navy to impotence and lead to phase two. which 
would be centered in the Aegean Sea. 
In the Aegean lay the true object of Turkish ambitions. Over many 
years Greece and Turkey had shaped their naval forces and tactics to 
confront each other. In Aegean waters the outcome of a fleet en-
counter was thought by both to be a toss-up, with perhaps the nod to 
Greece. Greeks owned (in their eyes) or occupied (as seen in Turkey) 
the many islands of the Dodecanese and Cyclades and expected to 
use them to ambush Turkish ships and aircraft in those confined wa-
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ten, with missiles and armed aircraft. But if Turkey destroyed the 
Greek navy first. then the islands could be isolated and all doors 
opened into the Aegean. 
It had become intolerable for Turkey that with sovereignty over 
those island~ Greece now dominated the Aegean. It was bad enough 
to suffer at the whim of a Greek government whose islands and navy 
could de facto close its vital sea lane through the Aegean into the 
Dardanelles and Black Sea. Then in 1995 Greece had extended its 
territorial waters to twelve miles in accordance with the UN's Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of November 1994. If Greece ever en-
forced the terms of the UN treaty-and it had never denied itself the 
right to do so-by international law it would de jure control access 
to the Black Sea and every port on Turkey's west coast. 
Beyond that, the Greek Islands influenced-in some eyes deter-
mined-the demarcation of the continental shelf for the purpose of 
establishing underwater mineral rights. Attempts at oil exploration 
under Turkish auspices had Jed to protests of encroachment from 
Greece. Authority over airspace and air traffic in the Aegean and mil 
itarization of the Greek islands near the Turkish coast were other 
grievances still unresolved. From these many aggravations, the lit-
toral waters off the west coast of Turkey took on the color of two 
armed camps. The final straw can1e when Turkish intelligence 
learned that Greece had sun-eptitiously introduced cruise missiles 
into Cos. Lemnos, and Chios. From that moment the aimed forces of 
Turkey commenced to lay the plans now in motion to seize the is-
lands and their missiles, as well as Samos and Lesbos. After that the 
government would strike the best bargain it could achieve in the 
courts of public opinion, striving for justice and a better balance in 
the Aegean. 
It mattered not a whit whether the Greek navy understood the 
Turks' two-pronged strategy to fight first at Cyprus and then in the 
eastern Aegean, for no Greek government could surv ive if Cyprus 
wa:-. abandoned. The Greek navy would have to risk all in one throw 
of dice that would be loaded in Turkey's favor. NATO was appalled. 
for Turkey and Greece were both members. The clisis that the other 
NATO nations had sought to avoid for over fifty years was upon 
them and they were helplessly divided. The United Nations was 






Amphibious operations against Limnos, Lesbos, Ch ios, 
Samas, and Cos from Ayvalik, Cesme, Izmir, Kusadasi, 
and Bodrun, 




i.1Jes of thl: Aegean. If thcrr..: wa~ lo be an enforced peace it would be 
by American action . 
Americ,111 I'ulicy D, < i~ion., 
When he Jcarned thr..: Turkish strategy. President Rainsford C. G. Har-
ril>, Princeton graduate and fervent admirer of Greek and Western 
c inluauon. was ready to intervene on the merits of the case: Turkey 
was the aggre::.sor; Turkey must be stopped. At the same time Harris 
must pcn,uade Greece, for itl> own good and the naval balance in the 
Aegean, to defer 10 U.S. diplomacy backed by the force of the Sixth 
Flee t. The State Department was more level-headed: democratic 
Turkey was a Wl!dgc of civiliLalion reaching inlo the Asian conti-
nent. It wa::. a country that understood and spoke the e thos of Is lam 
..., hik rLjccting the Lealotry of M oslem theocrac ies. It was a strong 
i.tale. s truggling for Mability, hopeful of prosperity, that had sought 
and recdved the fr iend shi p o f the United States and NATO during 
the years ..., hen il was thl! castenunost outpost of the West 's con-
f1ontation w ith th1.: Soviet U nion. Secre tary of State Dan M. Tinker's 
sympathies were with Turkey and its people who, he thought, had for 
years bt:en more than patient over the many provocations heaped 
upon them b) the Greek Cypriot majority. 
The two v iews coalc;sccd from oppo&ilt! poles into one American 
action. In che eyes of the National Security Council this was a mar-
itime cri~i~ for which there should and would be a naval solution. For 
lifry year~ the U.S. Navy had interposed off Taiwan, the Levai1L, 
Africa. anJ Cenu·al An1cric~ in the South China Sea; and in south-
v..e:-:.L A:.ia. Though the Navy•~ effect on the landward s ide was im-
perfect, when a maritime issue was al stake, as was the case now in 
the eastern Medite rranean . the Navy could boast unblemished suc-
ccs!:> ~incc 1949. Nor had any attack been consummated against it ex-
cept by accident or with tha t impersonal weapon. the mine. 
H~ncc the NSC proposed to interpose two Aegis c ruisers between 
Cyprus and the ports of hkenderun and Mersin where Turkish sol-
d1ef:'> "'ould soon embark for a stro ngly protected move to Cyprus. . 
The American amhassador in Ankara was instruc ted to carry a coldly 
correc t diplomatic note to Prime Ministe r Yusuf Bey to the effect that 
an) ffiO\ ~ towarJ Cyprus wa~ a m ove against the United States of 
Amcn..:.1. Pri.=sidc:nt H arris would publicly declare the single thing on 
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which he and Secretary Tinker were in iH.:cor<l: ne ither Greek no r 
Turkish ships and aircraft woul<l be allowed to fire on the other. or al-
ter the military balance in Cypru1>. with missiles, troops, or anything 
else. To give this weight, Harris would speak by video te leconf c rcnc.:c 
to President Hatzopoulos of Greece to assure him that no ship~ 
would approach Cyprus until passed upon by the U.S. Navy. Hat-
ropou_Ios agreed to stand aside, but not cheerfully, for his own navy·1, 
passions were aroused. Meanwhile, in Ankara the interview had not 
gone well for the American ambassador. He could only report that 
his diplomatic note suffered curt dismissal by a stol id and stoic prime 
minister. 
The Campaign Begins 
Those diffic ult events had transpired by 26 July, o nl y five days ago. 
As theater naval commander, Grant's views had been solic ited , of 
course. When he heard the plan from General Grouse. he said 
COMSIXTHFLT, Vice Admiral Paul T. " Patent" Anchor, wou Id di-
rect Aegis ships to start eastward at once. But Grant asked for and 
Wal> granted the following additional provisions: 
-Four, not two, Aegis warships would inte rpose off Cyprus in pain, 
nonheast and northwest of the island. 
- Three submarines would move into the same waters, unanno unced 
and invisible. 
- The carrier battle force, one CVN and four escorts, would be 
brought to full readiness 150 miles from Turkey with suflicicnt 
sea room for defense in deplh but close enough to cover th!.! inter-
posing American warships. 
Meanwhile Grant moved the three-ship amphibious ready group 
well to the wesL Afloat the M arines expeditionary unit should be 
pro tected~ but all eight of his Aegis ships were committed. He con-
templated but discarded the idea of moving the Marines ashore. 
Therefore he dispatched what was left: eight little 800-ton Cusliings 
tied up to a short wharf next to the submarine tender at La Maddalena 
in Sardinia. Offensive ships. the Cushings were not configured for 
escort, but Grant wanted them underway, free of any Italian interfer-
ence. They were to rendezvous with the three ships of the ARG and 
lo iter in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Cushings arc intended for short swift 






(t DD<...s Arleii;h Burke and John Paul Jone:> 
2 CG:,, Ticonderoga .1nd Valley Forge 
TURKEY 
.AnJ....1,., . 
"--;- SSN:- Annapolis, Chicago, .ind San Fr.mcisco 
.a CVN Ronald Rea~an \.vith CG Gettysburg, DOG O'Kane, 
and DD!> LetLwich and Harry \I\~ H ill 
(s) ARG moving west 
._!_ Turki:,h troop~ embarking 
8. Supporting airfield!> 
U.S. Sixth Fleet lntcrpos~ 
ton.:cmem-. lrom the Atlantic Fleet in ten days. Until then , the eight 
<.:ri:ws. s ixty each, would have to to ugh it o ut with the ARG. But the 
corvettes had drilled for sustained crisis operations before and Grant 
had conhJcnce that Commander Grid ley,* the tactical commander, 
would keep them al the ready. 
ln th~ amphibiou~ l>hips i !> a dc tachmenl of SEALs, expcns in spe-
cial warlarc. for whom G ran1 envisioned a possible ro le. So he ha:-
ord.:rt:d 10 :::.ea the three operative PCs from the ir ba.-..e in Rota, Spain , 
• rvunl, ~..- n,-r.111011 tk-..:,·nd, nt ot th,· c.1p1a111 of D..-"'t) ·i. ll:ig,h1p at M.inil;; B-1} tn I blJI\ 
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with instructions to pick up the SEAL~ from the amphib5 nor1h ol 
Sardinia and then head eru.t. 
Also at Rota is a 40,000-ton mother ship capable of carrying eight 
200-ton Killer-Scouts and ten STOVL aircraft at a speed of thirty-
two knots. Altogether there are thirty of the lclhal 200-ton vessel~. 
configured variously for inshore missions and task5. Twe lve of the 
thirty, called Phantoms, arc armed with tactical land-attack mii-silcs. 
Grant ordered the mother ship to load eight Phamoms in ib well dee[.. 
and sail eastward into the Mediterranean, with the PCs in company. 
The Shocks 
As Admiral Grant feared, the Turks were not dcterrl!d. On 28 July. 
just before midnight, the first attack took place during the change ol 
the watch in the USS TiconderoP,a's CIC. It came in the fom1 of 
eighteen land-, air- , and sea-launched. American-made Harpoonl. 
missiles that approached from all points of the compa!>l>. The Tico 
and her consort, the Valley Forge. dealt with seventeen of them, but 
one of the ASCMs penetrated and struck the Tico amidships. putting 
her dead in the water and out of action. The Valley Forp,£' , distracted 
while rendering assistance, was then 5truck in the next attack at 0025 
on the twenty-ninth by one penetrating Harpoon, knocking out her 
missile battery. While the other two Aegis ships rushed to a!>sist from 
sixty miles away, eight more Turkii.h Harpoon::. arrived. Five mis!'>ed 
or were defeated by soft-kill, bul two struck one ship and one the 
other, rendering both dere lic t. At 0230 the two undamaged DDGs ar-
rived, circled. and sweated until fleet tugs coukl arrive from Napk!'>. 
The attacks s topped. Turkey either had no other Harpoons at the 
ready, was husbanding those remain ing, or fe lt that the destruction 
was enough. ln the two crippled wan,hips there were ninety casualtic!'>. 
Immediately after that, the Turks. thinking the way wa5 clear. 
sailed an army brigade in five LST~ and two transports heavily e~-
corted with destroyers and frigates, all under intense air cover. But 
the three U.S. SSNs were lurking nearby. One tletectcd, trailed. and 
called in a second. The two penetrated the screen in tandem and at 
0410 sank an LST and both transpon., in six minutes. Seven hundred 
Turkish soldiers and sailors perished. 
After assimilating the facts of the disaster. at 0530 o n 29 July Ucn 
era! Grouse spoke per!>onally to the chainnan of the JCS. in the mid 
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dlc of the nighl in W::c.hington. He demanded the removal of Admi-
ral Grant and propo~ed to bring down the full weight of American 
firepower on Turley with n1ass ive air and missile strikes. Further, he 
said, he h~d put U.S. Army forces on full alert. Grouse subscribed to 
JCS doctrine of full spectrum dominance through comprehensive sit-
uational awarcnc~s and precision strike. But the chairman reflected 
on the prudent measures Grant had taken and the fact that Grant was 
his be~t fighting admiral. He and the secretary of defense were as ap-
palled at Grouse's heedless adherence to doctrine as they were at 
Turke y '~ dcep-seate<l determination and the bloodshed of the stun-
ning attacks. Five hours late r, at 0600 Washington tin1e, they met 
w ith the prel>idcnt and within the hour received his endorsement, 
l'irst , to order Grouse to keep hjs planes on the ground and troops in 
their barracks. Second, they concluded that if there was to be any 
hope of the United States forestalling the outbreak of war, then the 
conflict must be contined to the sea. The chairman believed that this 
was feasible becau~c il would be what Turkey wanted as well. 
Turkey had somehow to be s lopped from moving into the Aegean, 
ye t without hitting Turkish territory. Since the American role was to 
be strictly maritime. a skip-echelon command stnJcture designatt d 
Admiral Grant the ad hoc combatant commander. 
Concurrently the pre~ident and secretary of state had to move 
heaven and eanh to bring the Turkish government to its sen ses. 
World opinion must be brought 10 bear, while Greece was kept on the 
sidel ines with a~surances that no Aegean island would fall to Turkey. 
A som ewhat chastened president now agreed that Turkey could be 
told, through the Russians perhaps, that the world would look sym-
pathetically on its frustrations once it abandoned its intention of 
forcible entry into the Greek islands. 
Even before the N SC meeting, the commander-in-chief set the 
wheeb in motion. Still in disagreem ent. Grouse resign ed. At 1400 
Naple l> time on 29 July, Grant was told his m ission was to keep Turk-
i~h forces from ~eizing the Greek islands and without touching Turk-
1~h ~oil! In the fifteen minutes it takes the secretary of defense and 
chairman to outline the situation as seen from Washington , Grant has · 
fonnulated a solution to his knotty problem. He asks. does •·soil" ex-
clude thl.! Turkish transport~ in port? The secretary mumbles and the 
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chairman blinks. Grant concludes that he ha:-. all the ofticial sanction 
he is going to get. They will have the details of his plan soon enough. 
At once Grant summons his staff, outline~ his concept, and asks 
for a swift estimate of the situation. The staff sec a major alternative 
to the Turkish investment of the islands by sea to be airbon1e inva-
sion. For various reasons Grant concludes that if the Turks do not be-
lieve they control the coastal waters to move safely by ship then they 
will not attack at all.* 
That settled , next the staff makes the calculations for an operation 
order and rapidly feed it into a dynamic, geographical plot depicting 
a host of interlocking movements. By 1900 on the twenty-ninth these 
have been tweaked and approved by Grant and disseminated elec-
tronically to all NAVEUR ships and stations. The Joint Chiefs re-
ceive and quickly digest it. For information and in case the conflict 
escalates, USCINCEUR(acting) also has it. 
Enemy Moves 
By 2000 on the evening of the san1e day the Turkish high command 
accelerates its time table by issuing orders to move troops to the 
LSTs, LCTs, LCMs, and transports for the short run to the five Greek 
islands. Simultaneously the Turkish surface fleet is ordered to close 
on the five ports of embarkation, in order to screen the movement 
and support the landings. Air Force aircraft are shifted to western 
Turkey and search and covering tasks ass igned. Six modem diesel 
submarines move into screen stations, and minecraft (unable to 
match the pace) prepare to lay minefields. 
At first light on the thirtieth evidence of Turkish troop, ship, and 
aircraft redeployments is observed by American satellites. By mid-
morning clues to the imminent invasion are inserted in global com-
mand and control systems displays and text. In Naples via GCCS 
* This 1s a cavalier dismissal of a real choice. for much of the Turki~h am1y is air-mobile' . 
I set it aside because I have already painted what seems a sufllciently complica1cd operational 
situation to make the point that tactics auempt 10 reduce operational considera1ions to a sunpk 
and str.iightforward combat plan. Among the man) American ac tion, when an incipient ai, 
movement was detected, one might be to insert the otherwise unemployed SI.:.AL,- to pcrlonn 
!heir mischief at the airhead,-, which for fast turnaround Turl.cy would want near it, west coa,-1. 
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Grc111t ha, Lhe same information hc lo in Washington. Nint! destroyers 
and fa~t-ttll..ick craft will ~ coming down from the Dardanelle!>. He 
e::.Limatc~ that some of these ship!> carry Harpoons but most will have 
shoncr range Penguin mis:,iles well suited for the cluttered waters of 
the nonhcn1 Aegean. Though he cannot see tl1cm on tl1e plot, the en-
tire Ionian co~t is blanketed wiLh !>mall patrol boats and fishing ves-
sel:. employed to supplement Turkish air reconnaissance. 
~loving west from the vicinity of Cyprus will be ten Turkish war-
ship~ clearly identified by satellite as Harpoon shooters. About 
twenty more Tur1.ish destroyers, frigates, and fast-attack craft are in 
the na, .ii b~e at Aks.u on the southwest Anatolian coast. Grant ex-
pect~ all that arc able to get underway to join the Cyprus contingent. 
Thus, he expects to face coming up from tl1e south an enemy force of 
twenty-five or more destroyers and fast-attack crafl, carrying among 
them about 180 Harpoon missiles. They will enter the Aegean on the 
cvcnini- of 3 1 Jul) . 
Even more crucial to his plan, the satellites have pinpointed the 
exact locations of the transports and larger amphibious ships in five 
p orL'. of embarkation, Ayvalik off Lesbos, Cesme and lzmir near 
Chio!>, Ku!>adasi near Samos, and Bodrum adjacent to Cos. The 
u-oopship po!>itiun~ arc known c.>.actly and the precise latitude and 
long1tuoc of individual targets have been passed to his ships so that 
the coordinate!> can bl: plugged into their missile guidance systems. 
Which missiles'? They must be the small ballistic missiles carried 
in the Phu,110111!:>. These are nomially used for tactical support of 
l\1ai inc~ or soldiers fighting ashore. Harpoons and Tomahawks are 
next to u~dl.!!>s, for one thing bccau:,e most of the ports are deeply 
embcdckd in the 1 urki!>h coast behind terrain that is tricky for cruise 
mis::.ilcs I\> traverse. For another, Turkey will be expecting cruise 
mi:-.~ilt:-. am.l has the port defenses to Lake out most of them. On the 
oth.:r hanJ , th e- Plw11tc1111~ · LacticaJ ballistic misi.i les (TB M s) are so 
ncv. that Turkey has no defem,e against them worthy of the name. A 
navy modilJcation of the anny's tactical weapon, they can be deliv-
ered "'11h the greatest precision and with a time of flight of only a 
fe\\ mu1uh.'s_ From till' outset. Grant had dismissed an air strike from 
th~ Sixth Fkt:t carrier USS Ronald Reagan. in part because there 
\.-\ oulu be too much collateral damage to the port cities, in part be-
cau .... .: o, er rv. o hundred Turki :.h fighters would be arrayed against 
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them. The Sixth Fleet's four submarines mul.t stay in a blocking po-
sition between Turkey and Cyprus. They cannot cover all the ports in 
the Aegean, nor doe!> he want SSNs tangling with Turkish mines and 
diesel submarines in the Ionian coast's shallow waters. 
The Tactical Plan 
To deliver their TBMs the Phantoms must not just survive to reach 
their launch positions within ninety miles of the targeted ports. They 
must do so before the Turkish transports and LSTs get underway. 
Movement, even slow movement, is the friend of surface ships and 
foe of long-range miss iles, especially in the cluttered coal.tal envi-
ronment. Furthermore, Grant 'i. infom1ation is not firm as to where 
the Turks are headed. They have much better knowledge than he of 
the beaches and Greek defenses. Once the transports are underway 
his problem is uni.olvable. That is what he saw instantly when his 
mission was briefed to him by the chairman. and why he needed pas-
sive acquiescence to hit the transports in their ports where their loca-
tions were known to within a few meters. 
Grant long ago had concluded that without the new Phunroms he 
bad no maritime solution. Eight of them, each with ten small TB Ms, 
will be enough to neutralize nineteen transports and LSTs, ignoring 
the small landing craft that are too numerous to strike. He estimatei. 
that if he takes out half or more of the nineteen large ships, then the 
Turks cannot proceed and will have to delay long enough for the ar-
rival of the full Atlantic Fleet. 
Lieutenant Commander Genda. the tactical comniamlcr of the 
Phantoms embarked in his tiny flagship. the Ninja , will target all 
nineteen.* Even though there might be a few undiscovered troop 
ships, Genda's orders are to shoot the works: launch all eighty TBM~ 
in one sudden pulse at the targets located by satellite. 
Though eighty missiles against nineteen undefendablc target!> 
seem to be ample overkill, Grant docs not expect 100 percent cover-
age. The missile~ have bomblets that blanket an area of two football 
fields that is nom1ally filled with enemy tankl>. They are less than 
• 111 h•~ Ndval A~adcmy day~ Samm) (for Samarai) C.kncfo wa, ob ... cn·cJ IO he .i ma~tcr c,f 
creative mi~chief. I-It' would never have ~urv1veJ 10 gradua1c ii 1h.: CommanJ.ull h;itl no1 p.:r-
suadcd the Superintende nt tha1 Sammy Gend.1 ·, takm ... wou_lJ ,omc d.i~ brinp nd1 reward,. 
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iJ...:..tl ship-kilkrs, but they wiJI wreak havoc to the topsides, e lec-
tronics, bridges and probably one deck down in each tram,port. If 
tro~1ps are aboar<l the carnage will be dreadful. Grdllt hopes to launch 
hu, stril-..c before they embark. Of course the Joss of life would seal 
the delay he scck.s, but the bloody result of such an artack is hardly 
the way to soothe Turkish passion or evoke sympathy among the 
press and world opinion. 
The probkm is moot. The auack is scheduled for the earliest pos-
sible m oment. The Plwmoms' fast carrier is slated to pass south of the 
Pc loponnesw, at 1700 on the 31st, an hour behind the Cushings. Since 
the pa.<:,s:ige will be in daylight and the weather clear, it could be spot-
ted. but Grant thinks that until the Plwnwms are launched no Turkish 
alann bdls will ring. The Phantoms will enter the water after dark, 
around 2 100, just west of the Cyclades. It will take a courageous 
Turkish reconnai~sance effort to reach ac ross the Greek-dominated 
w.ucrs and a lot of Turkish faith in Greek res traint. From the Ronald 
R~ugan an air screen will be Hying between the Cyclades and Dode-
canese until dark as a fabl.! indicator of American intentions . 
The big h.uard to the Pha1110111s is not the Turks but the Greek:::.. 
\Vill the word from Athen:::, be disseminated? Will the Greeks eschew 
thl.!tr ov. n reconnaissance eff on? Will scores of Greek ships and air-
craft and mis!>i le batteries let unjdentitied ships· pass unreported and 
unmo lested? Grant did not reveal his plan to Athens; a leak was too 
lil..cl),. He can afford lo lo:::,c som e aircraft; he will s urely lose Cush-
ini:s; he cannot afford to lo:::.c Phm110111<:.. 
After dark the Phantoms will glide through the Cyclades. Having 
no dcctromagnctic sjgnature. they can only be detected by human 
C) c. Low in the water, small at 200 tons. and stubby so as to fit in 
thl.!tr mothership-carrier, even in daylight they are never easy to de-
tect. At nigh1 in a state three sea under a waning moon that will not 
ri :::.c until 0100. the re is a good chance that they can penetrate the Cy-
cl.idc') unnoticed by both Greeks and Turks. A chance fisherman or 
coastal trade r will likely sec dark shapes with no lights, but a report 
01 their m ysterious pre.,ence will take time. And no Greek or Turkish 
missik seeker head can detect and home on a Phantom ; gunfire and 
cutl a-.scs are the only weapons against them. They will report their 
mo\.cmenb and locations to each other covertly via satellite. It be-
mu,l.'s Genda to k.now his vcsscJs will be almost s ide hy s ide but v,r-
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tually invisible to each other. There will be no fonnation and no mu-
tual support. Any one of them that is picked off must be abandoned. 
its c rew of twelve left on its own. 
Genda will take the Ninja, Phamom, Ghost, and Furtif* northca.<.;t 
and, after clearing the islands, run the last fifty-five miles acroi,,:,. open 
water, though to suppress their wakes the passage will be more like a 
tiptoe than a sprint. The four will take sta tion just east of the little is-
land of Psara and huddle almost against its coast. There they will ren-
dezvous and await Grant 's s ignal to launch, at 0400 on l August. 
Their targets are in Ayvalik, Cesme, and Izmir. 
The second set of four Phantoms are under the senio r CO. Lieu-
tenant Stephanie Decatur embarked in the BlaL·k Knight. With the 
Sting, Mist, and Silencioso she will take a more southerly route. pass-
ing slowly, quietly, and separate ly through the Greek islands, gather-
ing again at their launch point in the shadows of Dhcnova no rth of 
Amorgos. t Their targets arc in Cesme, in duplication of the northem 
task element, and in the ports of Kusadasi and Bodrum alone. 
Everything else in the Sixth Fleet is in support of the intended 
0400 attack, but the Cushings play the indispensable role. Their tru.k, 
though simple to signal and straightforward. is tac tically demanding. 
hazardous in the extreme, and one for which no other U .S. Navy 
warship is suited . The eight Cushings' task is draw attention and . no 
doubt, missile fire from up to twenty-five Turkish warships. 
They Are &pendahle 
Grant had ordered the eight old Cushin~s from their base at La Mad-
delena to screen the three amphibious ships. Once he saw then.: 
would be fighting in the Aegean , he o rdered them ea.,; t. There are 
seven of them now, because one corveuc broke down. They must be 
at the entrance to the Aegean between Crete and Kilhra an hou r 
ahead of the Phantoms' mo ther ship. so he ordered them to arrive 
• In navy tr.idition warships carry name~ even when they co:,1 only S,6(1 million: stc.1hh) 
U.S. Air Force bomber~ do not, even when they cost twClll) time:. mor,·. 
t 1n her veins Oo...,~ the blood of the ofticcr who in th<' dead of ru!!III on Io Auf!u<t I bl~ 1. 111 
out :ind burned the An1crican fniatc P/11/Jdelphia that h.,d run aground ,md been ~pturcJ h) 
Tnpolitaruan pirate,. Decatur was later killed in a dul· I. Stephanie h.1vini; a 1cmp..-r,1111cnt II• 
match her ancestor. it i!. probably well that duelinf i, pa~-.c in her modem. mor.· civih1cd nav~. 
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lht.:rc ..il l 600 o n 3 I July. They have 500 miles to travd, but because 
of Gram ·s for\!sighl they have ample ti mt: . He sent them through the 
Strait of J\.1cssina lo shorten the dis tance and also to increase the 
chance that the: Turkish navy would know they were conling. For the 
Cu.\hings are his bait; son1c and perhaps all seven will sacrifice them-
selves to draw a11cntion from the P/u,111ro111s. 
Years ago twelve Cushings had been homeportcd in the Mediter-
ranean at Grant's insiMencc when he was Commander Sixth Fleet. 
They had been crucial in defeating the Soviet fleet on 1 August 1998 
i.n the 1986 edition, whic h did not foresee the collapse of the Soviet 
Umon. Of tht! ten now rl!muining, all eight not in upkeep had put to 
sea, am.I s~vcn arc coming. Of 800 toru. with a crew of sixty, the main 
annamem oi each com,isb of eight Harpoon missiles and a seventy-
s ix-millime tcr gun. They have meager ASW capability, but that is ir-
rck:vant. Each carries a Lamps helicopter. They arc similar to dozen.-. 
of the older desigm, among the world 's best coastal naviei.. Seven will 
be enough to play the ir sacrific ial role. 
Commander "Ready" Gridley, Grant ·s own choice, has been in 
tactical command for a year and has the Cushing comn1anding offi-
cers bondeJ ill> a team in which each knows what to expect from the 
others. The tac ti<.:al execution of the operation that will ensue will be 
Gridley ·s. buL the tactics are an extension of Gram ·s own, worked out 
years ago. The Cushings arc obsolescent for this mission, because 
tbt:r~ is a big question whctht:r their Harpoons will penetrate the de-
icnscs of Turkish war...hips. The Ttuks are similarl} armed with their 
own Harpoon variant. Moreover, the Turkish navy has trained assid-
uow,ly to dcfcnd against Harpoon attacks because that is the princi-
pal thn:at in the Greek surface navy. Turkish skill with and against 
Harpoons is the penally of American foreign aid, thinks Grant wryly. 
Gridley wilJ pa!-.s north of Crete and until dark steer s lowly along 
the..! coast with radars on and radios blaring tactical signals to assure 
that the Turks and everyone else knows where he is. Carrier aircraft 
M.:ouu ng betwcc.!n the Cyclades and Dodecanese will see any Turkish 
fom1a1ion and forestall an ambush. The aircraft will also confirm the 
satellite information of the enemy's composition. Al dusk around 
1900 he will alter coun.c radically to port. step up speed to 31 knots, 
anJ head for the little is land of Anal1. At 2100 the Cuslii11gs wiJJ 
torrn two very ragged lines abreast of four and three corvette::.. Lat-
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eral i,pacing bCI\\ ccn i,hip!) is an imprecise Jive miles. The two linci, 
will leapfrog altc:mately, on signal via laser lampi.. Each line in tum 
will sprint ahead al thirty-five knob plus, while the other dawdJes al 
:.ix in an a11emp1 lo look like small, innocuous shipping. Near Anafi 
al around 2300 thc:y will shape a course eastwards toward the best 
es1irnatcd position of lhe twenty-tive Turkish warships. 
On a rotational b.i!>il:,. two of their Lamps helicopters will fly south 
tone~ the coast of Crell.!, flying high with radars turned on, for a de-
c~pLion within a dl!ception. If the Turks have studied the Cushing 
tactics, they will expect them lo be hugging the coast. On another oc-
ca.-.ion, the helicopters would be crucial scouts, but tonight with con-
fu:.ing contacts aJI around, Gridley docs not expect them lo add much 
informa1ion. He doci. nol know whether the Turkish fleet will have 
heiicopter.s up and scouting at night. Their role ii. not a crucial factor, 
because: the enemy has operational knowledge of his presence, and it 
i:. onl} the detaib of his tactics that he wishes to conceal. If a heli-
coptl!r approa1.:hc:s from the east to invt!stigate his corveues, their or-
dcfa are to shoot it down a1 eight miles. The American nigbt combat 
air patrol from the carrier is to intimidate anything in the air moving 
at fifty knob or greater, everywhere but off the north coast of Crete. 
Gridky only dcpenili on the jet!) for hara:::.sment and perhaps Lo chase 
Sl!arch aircraft away. 
GriJky expccti,, the enemy's screen of Harpoon-armed fast-attack 
craft to be in a scouLing line ahead of the destroyers. If any of their 
radar::- arc on, then hi::- ships, running silent, will detect first, well 
within missile range. An1erican and Turkish Harpoons can reach sev-
enty nautic al milel,, but Gridley expects to launch his weapons at a 
third of that because of the incipient electron1agnctic duel over first 
detection, tracking, and targeting. Harpoons home with great preci-
!>ion. but th..: Cushings will be ::-booting where neutral traffic and in-
nocent thbennen can be unintended targets. One Cushing only will 
hr~ a salvo of nol more than three Harpoons down the bearings of 
any imerminently radiating screen ship. The shooter will then at-
tempi to clear laterally away from a predictable return salvo at high 
speed and u-.c passive antimissile defense!). The other corvettes will 
i.low and \.\ ail for another radiating target. The reason for the puny 
salvo ii- b.::cause Gridley must attempt to survive as long as possible 
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and drain the Turkish ships of as many mi:.sile~ as he can. If the 
Turks approach with radars off, then sharp eyes will dctem1inc who 
sees and shoots first and how well, and guns will be as deadly as mi~-
siles. With radars off on both sides it wiU be an ugly ml.!lce, and the 
smaUer force-the C11slzi11~s-will do less damage to each other! 
These actions are well-drilled tactics, the major difference being 
that the seven Cushings with fifty-six Harpoons cannot defeat 
twenty-five ski llful Turkish warships carrying 180 similar missiles of 
their own. and who are practiced at fighting in their home waters. 
The Cushings must, atypically, husband their missiles in the hope of 
stretching out the battle. Though always wary, Gridley hopes, even 
expects, first contact to be east of Astipalaia sometime around mid-
night. He will draw the enemy west among the islands for as long as 
the surviving corvettes have the means to fight. Each captain knows 
be must keep the auention of the Turkish force south of Amorgm,, 
where the four southerly Phantoms will be heading. 
The chief of staff reminds Grant that Gridley is going to have a 
fuel problem. Grant is abashed; by such oversights are plans de-
stroyed. But Gridley repo11s that he will arrive with enough fuel to 
operate wide open for perhaps three hours and his ships will not be at 
fuU throttle all the time. The ships thal survive need only limp to the 
nearest Greek ii.land inlet or harbor. 
Grallt M01·es Aboard 
Around noon on 30 July. Grant and his battle staff depart CINCUS-
NAVEUR headquarters in Naples in two till-rotor Y-22s, leaving in-
structions to arrange an emergency meeting with the Greek minister 
of defense in Athens on the 31st. After landing on the Sixth Flee! 
flagship, he discusses the electronically transmitted battle plan with 
Vice Admiral Anchor. His old friend Patent tells Sam he wants a big-
ger role but concedes that if the Phantoms fail he will have more than 
enough to do in dealing with about 200 enemy aircraft. Grant play~ 
best-of-five acey-dt!ucy with the air wing commander, visits the 
chaplain, eats mid-rat soup and sandwiches with the aviators, show-
ers, and registers a nap in the flag cabin. 
At 0700 on the 31st he has the ~atelli1e imagery update via GCCS. 
It confirms the locations and numbers of Turlish warships in motion. 
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At 0900 he takes off in an e~corted S-3 for his meeting in Athens, set 
for 1300. En route the jets pas::. the V-22s who are also cleared to 
land in Athens. On arrival, he devotes his thirty minutes with De-
fcn::.e .M inis ter Loucas to emphasize the message already transmitted 
from Napk:.: '•If you please, do your utmost to tell everyone with a 
weapon to hold tire until a Turk tries to land on Greek soil. Strange 
:.hips may be sighted almost anywhere. They will be American or 
Turk.ish. Please leave them b1;;. Everything depends on every Greek 
sold ie r anq sailor holding tire." In actuality, Grant's plan does not 
stand or fall on Greek discipline, but if it breaks down he foresees 
charn, that will confound his own intentions and could open the 
floodgates of the war that he is trying to prevent. 
At 1400 his staff ostentatiously boards the S-3. which takes off 
under a flight plan filed for the carrier. Minutes later Grant departs 
unob::.c:rvcd in one Y-22, tiling only his flag lieutenant (and commu-
nicator) and his operations officer. Grant may be the only one in his 
conunand who thinks so, but he i:. finnly convinced that the battle 
plan now will survive without him. The crucial action will be by the 
Cu:,hings. and so he ha~ arranged a rendezvous with them south of 
Cape lvlatap:m. At 1500 the hovering Y-22 lowers the three 
NAVEUR oflil:ers to the d eck of the flagship , USS Vicwry. 
Grant'::. fear is not that Ready Gridley will be tinlid; just the oppo-
site, for the tactics they had worked out were all designed to attack 
effectively first and win. This time success depends on husbanding 
weapons so that enough Cushing firepower survives for an hour or 
more to sow confusion and draw the enemy's attention away from 
the Phantoms until the ir eighty tactical ballistic missiles are launched 
and they clear away to westward. Gridley has his orders, but in the 
flush of hrst battle, pa::.sion and his killer instinct might take over. 
Weighing the risks, like an old warhorse Grant believes be should be 
at the point of anack in the \lic10ry. In Naples he is superfluous. His 
chief of staff is the perfect campaign manager to keep Washington 
infom1ed anJ fend off the second-guessers, and the staff does not 
need him to sort out the inevitable problems of broken parts, emer-
gency supply. or a missed rendezvous. 
ln the \ ·icwry, Admiral U. S. Grant s it::. in the familiar squadron 
commanJer's station ju:-.t behind the pilot and copilot seats. Gridley 
ha~ the copi lo t '::. seat nonnally occupied by the 00D. Lieutenant 
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Commander Ray Bemoui, the captain, sits at the pilo t 's console, 
which controls all operationaJ aspects of the flagship.* The OOD has 
a fold-down seat nom1all y occupied by the Boatswain 's Mate of the 
Watch, while the boatswain 's mate stands watch on his feet, the old-
fashioned way. The ClNCUSNA VEUR ops officer and flag lieu-
tenant sit on campstools. It is a bit of a squeeze. 
One of the terrible things about this war is that he, Grant, is fi ght-
ing an old friend. He first met and played squash with the present 
Commander~in-Chief of Turkish Naval Forces, Mchmet Abdul, in a 
port visit Lo Izmir when they were lieutenants. Their families grew 
close when Mehmet attended the Command and Staff course at the 
Naval War College fifteen years ago. Late r, as staff officers they plot-
ted and schemed how they might coordinate a NATO operation 
against the Soviets in the Black Sea. The personal side of it is 
painful, but in addition both friends know how the other thinks about 
tactics. M ehmet will know Sam had something up his sleeve. There 
are not many opponents as mentally prepared to combat Grant and 
the Sixth Fleet as Admiral Abdul. 
San1 Grant regrets an oversight: he might have disembarked some 
of the Cushings to save lives, for not alJ sixty of each crew will be 
needed to serve the guns this night. He muses over the personal risk. 
If the plan fails, Grouse will get his wish after all; Grant will be re-
lieved and court-martialed. If it succeeds there will still be raised 
eyebrows because he did no t manage the battle in the conventional 
way. If he bas nusjudged the skill of Commander Gridley 's captains 
and crews or unde restimated the enemy, then they wiJI aJI soon be 
dead. The crews know the odds in a detached way, but they have 
never been in battle and with the optimism of youth think they arl! 
imn1ortaJ. 
Besides, the Cushings trust m e, Sam Grant, who beat the Sovict:-
and has never lost a battle. This time, if I have assessed the battle 
correctly, more than haJf the Cushings will be sunk or out of action: 
and a quarte r of these sailors, the best anywhere, will be casua lties. 
,. Bcc:motti is 1hc great-grandnephew o f Ro meo lkmoni. lt,ily \ lcadi11~ writer on 1'1,· ta..:1ic, 
and operat ion~ ofbb d.iy. Ray ha,, ab,-vrb<·J hi" ancestor's penchant for mathema tic:il an:i l}"" 
a, wdl as h is familiarity wilh opcrarinns in the- Mcditcrr.mean. 
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That is the pen,onal sidl.!. As combatant commander the imponanl 
operational question is, will my plan work? If not, it wiU be because 
the Plwmoms have also suffered severely, for there is enough 
overkill in their firepower that only a strange, unfortuitous event can 
defeat the attack. The TBMs have been tested, but never in battle. 
The intelligence is the best in the world, but it could have been de-
ceived in plotting th!.! Turkish ships. Grant's assessment must be right 
thm the troopships will still be pierside at the time of the TBM attack. 
If the Pliamoms fail, then there will be bloody war. The rest of his 
Sixth Fleet, at the point of the sword, will be punished. Worse, the 
prestige of the United Stat~ will be in shambles, the Greeks will 
fight, the weakened Turks will be caught in a disaster of their own 
making, and the potential chaos in the eastern Mediterranean and 
southv,:estcrn Asia is incalculable. 
All will be revealed in six hours, thinks Grant. Yes, the operation 
will succeed because it is sound. I didn't join this profession for its 
cenaimie!-.. The life is sweet if not assured. Truly few things are safe 
and sure in war, yet the pieces are in place. He has assembled the 
forces to execute a good plan. The young conm1anding officers of the 
Plwnroms and Cushings arc well trained in sound doctrine and the 
ships manned by crews able to stay up with swift and sudden warfare 
in the::.c: confining, confounding coastal waters. 
Grant turns to the tactical commander and says, ·'Your weapons 
an; fret!, GridJcy." 
Dc11ouen1e,1r 
Jn one aspect only can the outcome of Grant's battle plan be reason-
ably forecast. It is that the Phantoms wiU launch their missiles on 
time: and knock out enough Turkish amphibious capacity to fulfill the 
mission. 
A noveli::.t would be obligated to produce the rest of the story-
the battle itself. The author would create an aura of inevitability 
about the results. If she aspires to contemporary mores, then Grant 
must have feet of clay. He will err but die a hero's death. ln rebellion, 
if l nan-atcd the battle, Grant would live with honor unblemished. 
But insofar as the moral::. of this fable are concerned, Admiral 
Grant ·s life or death i~ irrelevant. 
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Grant's putting himself at the heart of the decisive tactical action 
will be jarring and unrealistic to some readers, but it fulfills the Jong-
standing naval tradition that a commander leads his forces from 
afloat. E. B. Potter, the eminent naval historian, said that on arrival at 
Pearl Harbor Admiral Nimitz only reluctantly decided that he would 
never be able to accompany his fleet to sea.* Nimitz had to stay 
ashore for access to sensitive intelligence and for freedom to com-
municate up and down the chain of command. Nimitz was going to 
lead a very long campaign. Grant does not have these problems, for 
his short campaign must result in one successful battle or fail. In that 
it is fair to predict that he will succeed; this is so in part because he is 
in the thick of it at the decisive point But in most contemporary cir-
cumstances the fighting fleet is better served if the operational com-
mander stays at headquarters while the tactical commander fights. 
Grant is nearly unique because I have embodied the requisite tactical 
skills in him. 
A novelist would also tell us whether the American fleet's tactical 
victory led to successful negotiation and peace restored. l off er the 
reader no assurances about this. I can only assert that the president 
saw his best chance, the chainnan of the Joint Chiefs gave the job to 
the best man, and American forces contributed everything that mili-
tary action could do to give breathing room for negotiations. 
A detailed description of the fighting would center on the Cush-
ings' brave deception. The seven little combatants take on a force 
three times larger numerically and five times larger in displacement 
in order to draw some Turkish fangs. Neither side can do what every 
modem force anned with missiles wishes to do: stand off and deliver 
a decisive attack first. The battle is a purposeful melee, similar to the 
circumstances created by Rear Admiral Dan Callaghan, (though 
probably inadvertently) in his night battle of Guadalcanal on 12-13 
November 1942. Callaghan lost control but so confused both sides 
that one Japanese battleship was sunk and the other retreated. He 
died fulfilling his mission to protect Henderson Field at the clin1ax of 
the campaign. 
• Poner, The Batlle of th£• Coral S1·t1. in Swceunan. p. 244. 
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We saw in the previous chapter how to appraise the combat po-
tential of two missile forces in opposition. We saw that if both sides 
are able to engage, the circumstances will be so unstable that a small 
change in the hit probabilities, the distribution of fire, defensive ef-
fectiveness , or the thwarted detection and tracking of all the enemy 
will create wide swings in the resulting damage. We saw why this 
was so and that the instability is inherent in missile warfare. 
The only way to avoid the extreme uncertainty of outcome is to at-
tack effectively first. A battle of exchange will be confused and un-
predictable, yet Gridley 's orders from Grant are to force an ex-
change. Despite coherent fighting instructions) after only a few 
salvoes he will lose control and the result wiU depend on the wits, 
discipline, and sang froid in each Cushing. The same is true on the 
Turkish side. I have given the American side an edge in the first en-
counter (I don 't know whether this is reasonable), but any applica-
tion of the analytical technique in the previous chapter will conclude 
that the Turkish fleet can absorb an initial American success and still 
destroy the American force. 
The Turks would fight differently if their purpose was simply to 
sink American ships. But the Turkish tactical commander has a higher 
responsibility to protect the beachhead, that is to say, to secure the 
safety of the amphibious operation. He must also husband his forces 
because the Greek navy lurks just beyond the metaphorical horizon. 
At the operational level it is almost always the case that a victory at 
sea is a means and not the end, and external considerations abound. 
There is another reason I do not choose to narrate the night en-
gagement by which Gridley will empower the Phantoms' attack. A 
narrative would imply too much power of tactical analysis to trace 
the probable course of events and foresee the outcome in detail. For 
what it is worth I calculate that the Cushings might be expected to 
take down (put out of action) an equal number of the enemy-about 
seven. I calculate that the Turkish fleet would expend a half of its 180 
missiles in the confusion. The Cushings should expect to put more 
tonnage out of action and inflict more casualties because the enemy's 
ships are larger. If skillful in the opening moves, Gridley's seven 
corvettes might hit at most twelve enemy warships with the fifty-six 
Harpoons they can-y. If the Turks are quick to react, they might suf-
fer the loss of only three or four ships. 
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An interesting possibility is that countcrmca:--urcs against the Har-
poons arc unexpectedly so successful that many ships are untouched 
after both sides' missiles are used up. The bat Lie might conclude with 
gunfire. In a gunnery duel the Turkish force has a greater advantage 
still. Only the possibility of confusion could help the Americans to 
hurt and distract the Turks. 
It is reasonable for Grant and Gridley to expect that when the bat-
tle is over few, if any, Cushings will limp away. Applying both the 
history of missile combat and the quantitative analysis in chapter 11 . 
there is no way for the American Cus/,ings to def eat the Turkish bat-
tle force opposing them. The uncertainly of outcome is not that great. 
The Turkish fleet is quite competent, as are the coastal forces of 
many states when fighting in their home waters. 
Gridley 's Cushings are old ships similar to smaller, older combat-
ants among most of the world 's navies. The newness and the surprise 
are in the Phantoms. The Phamoms' TBMs. in combination with 
overhead sensors and a modem networked command and conrrol 
system, comprise Grant's decisive combat system. 
Though the circumstances of the Baltic of tl1c Aegean are unique. 
every battle in coastal waters wiU be unique. Many nations have 
well-conceived, tightly drawn, intensely practiced coastal defenses. 
In a more extended littoral conflict, land-based sensors. missile~. and 
aircraft will all be prominent. Depending on the geographical center 
of interest, coastal submarines and mines wilJ be important. Based on 
the compm,ition of coastal navies and their articulated stratcgie::., 
small surface combatants, usually carry ing n1issiles, will always par-
ticipate. Coastal commercial vessels on the surface serving as scout:. 
will also be important players. I believe to reduce casualties the U.S . 
Fleet must have numbers of smal l fighting ships that can be lost in 
combat without aborting a mission along a treacherous coast. It is for 
these reasons that I gave Grant the Phantoms and the Cushings. I do 
not think the existing An1erican navy, even with all of its firepower, 
can fight unbloodjed in the home warers of states with strong coastal 
defenses, including Turkey. 
 29 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
When we address the strategy for East Asia in Chapter III, the reader should be 
alert to the following similarities and differences from the Battle of the Aegean. 
D. SIMILARITIES 
1. Turkey’s interior lines of communication, sea-shore support structure, and 
local command and control are similar in important respects to China’s 
posture, though on a smaller geographical and military scale. 
2. Flotilla ships and submarines are useful to operate within the enemy’s 
inner sea lines of communications. 
3. There are places that scarce and expensive submarines should not be put at 
risk, but flotilla ships can operate when the stakes are high enough. 
4. The value of numbers. 
5. Designed stealthiness can be enhanced by geographical clutter. 
6. To keep a conflict from expanding, try to keep it at sea. 
7. Air attacks from land or sea bases are sometimes undesirable. 
E. DIFFERENCES 
1. In the Aegean, Admiral Grant’s Cushings and Phantoms are serendipitous 
and essential to success—with a bit of a nudge by the author to make them 
so. In the China Seas, the flotilla must be designed to be one part of a 
comprehensive strategy to keep the peace, or serve as a cost-effective 
component should local conflict ensue at sea. 
2. In the eastern Mediterranean, the small combatants operated from existing 
bases; in East Asia, they will be most effective if they are based well 
forward and inside the enemy’s attack envelope. 
3. In the Aegean, Turkey could not attack the small combatant bases. To 
operate inside China’s threat envelope, the flotilla must have mobile or 
concealed bases to survive, or take the risk, knowing that a Chinese attack 
against allied territory serves as a de facto warning that she is expanding 
the war. 
4. In the Battle of the Aegean, Cushings and Phantoms are the indispensable 
and decisive fighters. In East Asia, they are merely the lowest-cost 
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II. MISSILE WARFARE AT SEA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A country can, or will, pay only so much for its war fleet. That amount of 
money means so much aggregate tonnage. How shall that tonnage be 
allotted? And especially, how shall the total tonnage be invested . . . Will 
you have a very few big ships, or more numerous medium ships? 
                 Alfred Thayer Mahan9 
A. THEORY: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS WITH SALVO EQUATIONS 
What were the theoretical advantages that have caused the other navies of the 
world to build smaller missile combatants? The salvo equations describe the advantages 
of a more distributed fleet simply and clearly. Developed twenty years ago, they show 
mathematically that in combat between missile-armed warships, the number of vessels is 
the most important property a fleet can have. This general conclusion does not depend on 
geography or fleet size. 
The equations, with terms defined, are in Appendix A, along with some validations 
and applications of them. Here is a qualitative description of them. 
• There are two symmetrical equations representing the case in which two 
opponents “simultaneously” detect the enemy and fire missile salvoes at 
the other. 
• If one side detects the enemy, fires, and the missiles arrive before the 
enemy can fire, then the enemy must suffer the effects before shooting 
back. 
• The maximum possible number of missile hits in the attack is the number 
fired by each ship times the number of ships launching the attack. 
• The maximum number is reduced by the number each defender defeats 
(by hard kill, soft kill, stealth properties, or maneuvers) times the number 
of defenders. 
• In the model, the fiction is maintained that attacking missiles are 
distributed evenly across all defenders and each defender defeats the most 
it can of those targeted on him. 
• The result is that the total hits achieved is distributed evenly. The number 
of ships incapacitated by the attack is the hits divided by the missiles it 
takes to put one ship out of action (but not necessarily sunk). 
Among the citations in Appendix A are two evaluations by scholars in the 
People’s Republic of China. One Chinese technical paper evaluates and embellishes the 
basic equations. The other extends a thesis by Lieutenant (LT) Casey Mahon that uses 
salvo equations to explore missile combat between a land power and warships, 
presumably to test the efficacy of China’s Anti-access, Area-denial strategy. 
  
                                                 
9 Alfred T. Mahan, The Lessons of the War With Spain (Boston: 1899), 37. 
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The equations are the successors to Lanchester Equations, whose square law was 
applied to a formation of battleships. 10 Specifically, the salvo equations apply when 
missiles or torpedoes are fired in batches instead of “continuously.” The salvo-like 
phenomenon was also seen in the five big Pacific carrier battles in World War II, in 
which each side endeavored to detect and attack first with all its air wings simultaneously 
in a single pulse, or “salvo,” of aircraft attacking as a coordinated unit. 
The salvo equations show that if your fleet has three times as many combatants as 
mine, then for parity in loss ratios (in other words, which side will have ships remaining 
when all of the opponents are out of action), to overcome your numerical advantage each 
of my ships must have thrice the offensive power, thrice the defensive power, and thrice 
the survivability (the “staying power”) of yours. Brief reflection shows why. If you put 
one of my big ships out of action, I simultaneously lose its remaining offensive missiles, 
its power of defense, and its contribution as a target that the enemy now no longer needs 
to shoot at.11 
Another general truth quantitatively demonstrated by the salvo equations is the 
advantage of out-scouting the enemy and launching a first effective attack. This 
phenomenon first occurred in the aforementioned Pacific carrier battles of World War II, 
but the payoff of an unanswered first attack is even more pronounced in the missile era. 
The third general property of missile warfare shown by the equations is that if 
ship numbers and staying power are both small, then an unstable combat situation arises, 
in which the shift in results of an exchange moves from total victory to total loss within a 
small change in the number of ships on either side. This is, to an extent, an artifact of the 
equation structure, but it is a warning that a fleet of big surface warships can be put out of 
action with a small number of missile hits in twenty-first century combat.12 
                                                 
10  The square law was discovered by two American naval officers a decade before  
Frederick W. Lanchester. Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) Jehu Valentine Chase invented the differential 
equations, but in a more sophisticated form. Unlike Lanchester, Chase took account of the fact that most 
warships were not put out of action by one hit. Commander (later Rear Admiral) Bradley A. Fiske 
described the square law in a difference-equation form in the Naval Institute Proceedings’ Prize essay of 
1905. Both American naval officers showed the special advantage of numerical superiority. Lanchester 
thought the square law would apply in aerial combat. It did not; Morse and Kimball in 1953 concluded that 
air-to-air combat followed a linear law which says numbers and individual aircraft performance have equal 
value. This conclusion was confirmed by Niall Mackay of the University of York quite recently, using data 
from the 1940 Air Battle of Britain. Mackay shows that this was of great practical significance because it 
affected a debate among the British Air Marshals over the best tactics for deploying fighter defenses.  
U. S. Army operations analysts have tried to apply the equations to ground combat and found that they 
seldom match casualty outcomes of actual battles. An obscure Russian officer named Osipov independently 
discovered the square and linear law forms about the same time as Lanchester. Unlike Lanchester, Osipov 
tested their applicability with historical battle data and concluded that, for ground combat, the casualty 
generation rate on the two sides lies more or less half way between the square and linear laws. For the full 
text see M. Osipov, The Influence of the Numerical Forces on Their Casualties 1915, translated with an 
introduction by A. S. Rehm and R. L. Helmbold, Concepts Analysis Agency Research Paper,  
CAA-RP-91-2, 1991. 
11 Studies with salvo equations may be found in many places, including on Wikipedia under “Salvo 
Combat Model.” The root document is Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “A Salvo Model of Warships in Missile 
Combat Used to Evaluate their Staying Power,” Naval Research Logistics, March 1995. 
12  A good quantitative description of this phenomenon using the salvo equations is in  
Michael J. Armstrong, “Effects of Lethality on Naval Combat Models,” Naval Research Logistics, 51,  
no. 1, 1954, 28–43. 
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The salvo equations teach more by saying less—by shucking off the chaff of less 
important factors in order to concentrate on the kernels that describe what is most 
important in a sea battle. Like other useful combat models, they are valuable because a 
knowledgeable tactician will notice what they do not describe. A thesis student,  
LT Jeffrey Cares, used a simulation to test the salvo equations. Among several insights, 
he demonstrated “the sump effect,” in which the distribution of attacking missiles is not 
spread evenly and efficiently over all defenders, which is implicit in the model.13 That 
does not affect the general truths that come from the equations and, moreover, if one 
hopes to know how the missiles will be distributed, then he must estimate the effects of 
different radar cross sections, near-side attraction of ships by the missiles, and the 
tendency of a burning ship to draw fire and suffer disproportionate hits—thereby 
preserving the combat capability of the undamaged ships—and further enhancing the 
advantage of more distributed forces at sea. 
The equations may be modified to show the effect of surprise. Sometimes we 
enrich them to show the effects of soft kill and countermeasures which, as will be shown 
below, have dominated successful defender effectiveness. The equations only describe 
firepower’s effects and so the study of the often dominant effects of first detection and 
superior scouting must receive separate attention. Nevertheless, none of these or other 
considerations have upset the three general conclusions: (1) numbers matter most;  
(2) getting off an unanswered first salvo has special value, unless one’s own defenses are 
impermeable; and (3) a fleet with small numbers of very potent ships that can only take a 
few hits must be made aware of its unstable status in a battle. 
B. THREE EXTENSIONS PERTINENT TO A WAR AT SEA STRATEGY 
AGAINST CHINA 
In 2001, Singaporean Navy LT Keith Jude Ho wrote an expansive thesis on the 
advantages of small combatants. 14  Among his extensions of the salvo equations,  
LT Ho applied two stochastic models to explore the uneven distribution of missiles on 
enemy targets. This probabilistic approach complemented LT Jeff Cares’ simulation 
approach. Among his conclusions, Ho wrote: 
Results of both [stochastic models] show that when total firepower, 
offensive and defensive, is held constant [in a total force] the fleet significantly 
improves its chances of winning merely through distribution of its combat 
potential among more units. In some simulations of the salvo models, results 
indicate that there are specific instances when force concentration is preferred 
over force distribution. The ability of the distributed fleet to disperse or 
concentrate on demand makes it extremely adaptable to these instances. 
A second extension is in the thesis by LT Casey M. Mahon, who explored the 
possibility that the truism, “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort,” should be modified and 
                                                 
13 Jeffrey R. Cares, “The Fundamental of Salvo Warfare” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,  
March 1990). 
14 Keith J. Ho, “An Analysis of Distributed Combat Systems” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 2001). Ho was participating in a student research team that designed an inshore task 
force as a mix of small missile combatants (Sea Lance) and small aircraft carriers (Sea Archer) that could 
operate unmanned aircraft and helicopters. He helped to evaluate their performance in a littoral 
environment. 
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softened in the missile era.15 First, precision-guided munitions will now be more effective 
against fixed, land-launched missile sites than were guns against forts. In effect, a fleet’s 
offensive term in the salvo equation will be a bigger number. Second, a modern missile 
ship can defend itself against incoming missiles. In the gunnery era, there was no 
defensive term in the fleet’s combat equation like there is today. His thesis is particularly 
pertinent because of the long range of Chinese aircraft and weapons in the missile age. 
When he was done, Mahon thought he had demonstrated the truth of his thesis: the salvo 
equations show that a modern fleet is much more able to fight a “fort” of land-based 
missiles and aircraft. His thesis advisor was not so sure. The situation has improved for 
modern warships, but they can still be subjected to significant, and harder to replace, 
losses! Our point here is not who is right, but that the salvo equations could inform a 
campaign planner with quantitative insights that affect Air-Sea Battle planning. There is 
enough uncertainty in the mere 10 inputs for salvo modeling to cast doubt on the 
dependability of results from more detailed simulations with hundreds of inputs, many of 
which are just as imprecise. It is noteworthy that Chinese scholars have picked up on 
Mahon’s application of the equations. By using the salvo model for land-sea combat, they 
can reach their own conclusions about whether China or the United States will have the 
advantage against China’s antiaccess capability; the modern version of forts defending 
critical harbors.16 
The third pertinent extension of the salvo equations is a recent application by 
Commander Phillip Pournelle. His study, not yet published, is SECRET because he 
draws from many classified sources for data and scenarios. In his application, he pits 
different U. S. Navy task force combinations against a fixed enemy surface task force 
composition, in which both sides are sufficiently competitive that they decide to fight 
each other. In one part of a much more extensive quantitative analysis, he augments the 
defensive term in the equations to measure antiship cruise missile (ASCM) leakers 
(leakers being the small number of incoming missiles that penetrate a capable defense). 
More importantly, he counts both offensive and defensive missile expenditures. A stark 
and seemingly realistic outcome is that one side frequently expended all of its defensive 
missiles and was denuded of active defenses. This and other evidence suggests that it is 
very important to determine the sufficiency of (1) the missile load out in a single Aegis 
ship, (2) the missile mix in a task force, and (3) the total inventory of all categories of 
missiles in the entire fleet, when compared with our best estimate of enemy inventories of 
missiles, such as DF-21s. In the missile era, no strategy, campaign plan, or tactical 
doctrine is worth very much without an estimate of which side and under what 
circumstances is likely to be drained first of its missiles of any kind. Need we add that a 
substantial margin for error should be built into inventories at every level—from task 
force, to theater, to total stockpile? Once again, however, our point here is that one needs 
no more complexity than the salvo equations to make estimates that are sufficient to show 
whether we are likely to run out of weapons in any level of conflict. 
                                                 
15 Casey M. Mahon, “A Littoral Combat Model for Land-Sea Missile Engagements” (Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, September 2007). 
16  Wu Jun, Yang Feng, Cheng Yong-mei, and Pan Quan, “Land-Sea Combat Model for Littoral 
Engagement in High-Tech Warfare,” College of Automation, Northwestern Polytechical University, Xi’an 
710072, China, 2011. 
 35 
C. PRACTICE: THE RECORD OF MISSILE ATTACKS ON WARSHIPS 
SINCE 1967 
A good way to summarize the record of known attacks with missiles is by 
examining their hit probabilities against three target categories. The data that follows is 
taken from a 1994 thesis by LT John C. Schulte. Schulte’s data is not quite complete, but 
it is accurate enough to make the case that we are in a missile era of warfare at sea.17 
First, and as an argument in favor of small combatants, the hit probability of 
missiles fired at targets that defended themselves is 0.26. There were 32 hits achieved by 
121 ASCMs, resulting in 13 ships sunk and 16 put out of action. Most of the ships 
attacked were small—under 1,500 tons—and those that successfully defended themselves 
did so mostly with soft kill defenses and probably—the evidence is uncertain—with point 
defenses. Over 80% of the missiles fired when the attacker attempted a defense were in 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The average of 26% success conceals the fact that the 250-ton 
Israeli Sa’ar boats were 100% successful in defending themselves and that all losses were 
suffered by Egypt and Syria. A defender was either highly effective or highly ineffective. 
In only one instance has a surface-to-air missile (SAM) ship shot down a missile in 
combat. That was during Desert Storm in 1991. Iraq fired two obsolescent Silkworm 
missiles at the USS Missouri while it was conducting shore bombardment eighteen miles 
off Kuwait. One Silkworm failed on launch. The second was badly aimed, but HMS 
Gloucester shot it down after it missed the Missouri and was outbound. 
Second, the hit probability of missiles fired at ships that might have defended 
themselves, but did not do so, was 0.68. A total of 27 hits were achieved by 40 missiles 
fired at ships capable of defending themselves. The result was 6 ships sunk and 14 put 
out of action. These include USS Stark, HMS Sheffield, and the Israeli corvette Hanit. 
Third, a large number of missiles were fired against defenseless ships. Using what 
unclassified data he could find in 1994, Schulte calculated the hit probability to be 0.91, 
in which 57½ hits were achieved of 63 missiles fired. The hits resulted in 12 ships sunk 
and 42 damaged. Schulte’s count of total hits and missiles fired is low—Navias and 
Hooten tabulate more attacks—but his hit probability is sound, and it is still a very high 
percentage.18 
  
                                                 
17 John C. Schulte, “An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Antiship Cruise Missiles in Littoral 
Warfare” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1994). More attacks than Schulte found 
have been uncovered by Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooten and reported in Tanker Wars: The Assault on 
Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980-1988 (New York: I. B. Taurus, 1996). Another 
reference is Lee A. Zaterain, America’s First Clash with Iran: The Tanker War, 1987-1988 (Drexel Hill, 
PA: Casement Pub., 2008). Captain (Retired) Steven Woodall is an authority on attacks against warships. 
Woodall has the advantage of having participated in the tanker wars. 
18 The “one-half hit” is a curiosity. The Egyptians feared their big Styx missiles would not home on a 
vessel as small as a Sa’ar boat, so they conducted a live-fire test against the Israeli fishing boat Orit. Of 
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III. “OFFSHORE CONTROL” IN EAST ASIA USING A  
WAR-AT-SEA STRATEGY 
Put in the broadest terms that we use today, the fundamental strategic role 
for navies is to prevent any opponent from blocking the safe passage of 
any friendly craft on, over, or under the sea and to deny passage to any 
force that interferes with safe passage to its intended destination. 
         John B. Hattendorf19 
The findings of the workshop reported in October 2011 both motivate 
development of a flotilla for fighting on the surface and adumbrate the characteristics of 
the missile vessels. The findings make clear that a flotilla’s ships must be ready to go in 
harm’s way so that blue water ships with large crews, performing multiple missions, will 
not be lost. The workshop results have been expanded and published in an essay by this 
study’s authors in the Autumn issue of the Naval War College Review, entitled “Between 
Peace and Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy.” An independent study by  
T. X. Hammes reaches complementary conclusions, but emphasizes policy and strategy. 
He infers that offshore control of the China Seas is necessary and sufficient to retain U. S. 
influence in East Asia and keep the competition peaceful.20 In our study’s title, we use 
his descriptive term, “Offshore Control.” Laudably, Hammes pays particular attention to 
war termination, with some astute comments. This is the first time we have observed 
anyone introduce this important aspect of our strategy against China. The workshop also 
drew from an insightful paper by Robert D. Kaplan in which he writes, “Because of the 
way geography illuminates and sets priorities, the physical contours of East Asia augur a 
naval century.”21 
Worth pondering is the reasonable conclusion that China itself is conducting a 
very astute campaign of offshore control right now! Recent actions in the vicinity of the 
Senkaku Islands, the Paracels, the Spratlys, Vietnam, and elsewhere in the South China 
Seas resemble a war of intimidation at sea against our Asian allies and friends, hence the 
need for a U. S. strategy to keep the competition peaceful and in accordance with 
international law and conventions. 
Here are the workshop’s assumptions and findings, concisely expressed  
and updated: 
• The strategy with the highest expectation of retaining American influence 
in the Western Pacific is a maritime strategy we call a “war at sea.” It 
limits American and allied actions to the high seas only, insofar as the 
choice rests with the United States. The strategy also depends, however, 
                                                 
19 John B. Hattendorf, “The Past as Prologue: The Changing Roles of Sea Power in the Twentieth 
Century,” essay in Talking About Naval History: A Collection of Essays (Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, 2011), 285. 
20  Thomas X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” in the 
National Defense University’s Strategic Forum, June 2012. 
21Robert D. Kaplan, “The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict,” Foreign Policy, September-
October 2011, 76–85. 
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on maintaining the advantage at all levels of conflict, on land or sea, 
should peacekeeping fail. 
• We emphasize that the strategy, whether for peacetime influence or in 
war, cannot be effective unless it marshals favorable regional opinion, and 
also has the support of nations and institutions worldwide that profit from 
international trade. In every confrontation or conflict, the United States 
must be seen as acting in ways that protect their interests as well as ours. 
• The strategy cannot be effective unless its broad tenets are known to China 
and our Asian allies and other friendly states. The strategy must be openly 
declared, but the detailed operational plans to execute it will have many 
classified details. 
• China believes a great power must build a modern fleet to control its vital 
ocean interests, rather than be dependent on the U. S. Navy to protect its 
sea lines of communications. 
• The study premises that neither the U. S. nor China would invade the 
other’s homeland. 
• The U. S. will not initiate an attack on China with nuclear weapons. 
• If China employs nuclear weapons against the U. S. or our partners, we 
will respond with nuclear attacks. Whether the retaliation is proportional 
or massive will depend on many considerations. 
• A fundamental truth is that the Chinese reaction to confrontational steps 
by the U. S. is unpredictable, even when the American government’s 
actions are limited to protecting sea routes, retaining the trust of Asian 
friends, fulfilling treaty obligations, or enforcing international maritime 
laws. 
• It follows that a successful strategy for the Western Pacific must retain the 
advantage at every level of conflict, and obviously so. China must 
perceive no incentive to expand a conflict. 
• One of the most challenging elements of force design is that it must be 
suitable for the long-term competition and despite all Chinese naval 
developments. Our long-lived warships must serve in periods of 
cooperation, competition, confrontation, conflict short of all-out war, or in 
widespread war. 
• The Offshore Control strategy—T. X. Hammes’ appealing term—has as 
its central element the creation of a “no man’s sea,” that threatens to deny 
China safe operations in its own home waters, should it attempt to 
interfere with freedom of the seas for any nation, or claim the China Seas 
to be organic to the state. 
• The China Seas, defined as the waters inside the First Island Chain, are 
vast. Therefore, the offshore control strategy should have four 
components. 
• First, Interception Operations carried out by vessels efficiently designed 
to interdict China’s many and varied ships at remote choke points under 
the protection of blue water warships. Consistent with current policy 
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statements and the philosophy of a “1,000 ship [international] navy,” some 
of the inspection vessels may belong to friendly states. Intercept 
operations can be changed from warnings, to inspections, to seizures, to a 
maximum possible blockade, depending on the signal to be sent or the 
pain to be inflicted. 
• Second, Submarine Operations carried out within the China Seas. These 
actions can also vary in intensity up to the maximum possible destruction 
of Chinese warships, shipping, and submarines, excepting China’s SSBNs. 
It may be necessary to send every available SSN to the region in a crisis, 
both as a signal of resolve and to provide sufficient forces. Contributions 
from the diesel submarines of Asian allies and partners would add greatly 
to the effectiveness, but, for the present, the U. S. submarine fleet is 
believed sufficient to inflict great losses on Chinese shipping. 
• Third, Flotilla Operations carried out symmetrically to stop aggressive 
Chinese actions inside the first island chain. The small combatants are 
intended to fight in high-risk operations. They are the subject of  
this study. 
• Fourth, Marine Corps Operations establish outposts in the first island 
chain. We recommend that Marine plans include the fast movement from 
permanent locations, such as Darwin, Australia, to critical locations in the 
first island chain or Vietnam. The locations would serve several purposes, 
not least as forward bases for flotilla squadrons. Some Marine 
detachments would be covert and serve as passive listening posts. Some 
would base unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or helicopters acting as 
aerial scouts. Alternatively, they could service inconspicuous water-borne 
scouts converted from fishing boats or coastal traders. They could deploy 
land-to-sea missiles in well-concealed, survivable locations for the 
purpose of attacking Chinese surface warships or shipping to a range of 
100 miles or more. We believe our submarine force, even when 
augmented by allied submarines, will be in great demand, so another 
possibility is to base long-range and endurance unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs) instead of burdening the SSNs with the task of 
deploying, monitoring, and recovering them. Swift Marine action, a 
tradition of the force, can establish presence on key islands that China 
would also see to have great strategic value and wish to occupy. 
A. OPERATIONS IN EAST ASIA 
The emphasis in this study is on the third and fourth naval components. A flotilla 
operating in the East and South China Seas, and Marine outposts in the first island chain, 
add additional U. S. policy and strategy choices. Together, they greatly complicate 
China’s planning, yet constructing the flotilla and planning for Marine outposts adds little 
cost to the U. S. defense budget and manpower. 
Flotilla operations are intended to be symmetric, able to confront the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) “patrols” directly in the China Seas when China is acting 
contrary to international law. The flotilla can respond directly to PLAN actions there that 
restrict, restrain, or deny freedom of the seas for all shipping; thus, the flotilla 
 40 
complements U. S. maritime interdiction and submarine operations that are basically 
asymmetric, indirect responses. 
The Marine outposts play a similar symmetrical role. They would be established 
at strategic locations only in time of crisis and only in collaboration with a host 
government. Whenever possible we should wish to act ahead of China, but in some 
circumstances, for example if the U. S. government dithers, we may have to answer a 
Chinese island occupation with a Marine amphibious assault. An example is the 
Indonesian island of Natuna Besar in the Natuna archipelago, just south of China’s “nine-
dashed-line” region in the South China Sea. 22 The island is strategically located and 
relatively easy to defend—by either side—having dense forests, caves, and only a few 
beaches. A southern Ryukyu island near the Senkakus is another attractive location for a 
conjoint Navy flotilla and Marine outpost. A third prospective location is a Philippine 
Island north of Luzon, for example, Batan, or one of the Babuyans because, first, the 
land-to-sea missiles can reach in three directions instead of one, and second, because 
their strategic value would be immediately evident to China. 
In classroom work, students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have 
examined in a preliminary way these and other candidate locations. Specific places 
should not be public knowledge, but we believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should 
encourage planning now by the Pacific Command (PACOM) to specify operational roles: 
covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) listening posts; small and 
mobile bases for flotilla operations—once the vessels are commissioned—and aerial 
reconnaissance vehicles that are neither easy to identify nor attack; covert locations to 
deploy large UUVs; and in a category by itself, sites for batteries of land-to-sea, medium-
range missiles. 
The Navy flotilla and Marine outposts in the first island chain will be mutually 
supporting. A five-step program to develop this flexible, low-cost option is: 
• Build the flotilla and deploy half of it to friendly East Asian ports such as 
Sasebo, Okinawa, Subic Bay, Zamboanga, and Singapore, whence the 
ships could move rapidly to preplanned locations. 
• Maintain Marines and high-speed amphibious lift at locations such as 
Darwin and Guam, whence detachments could move rapidly to the  
same locations. 
• Identify the best strategic locations, develop classified war plans, and 
negotiate an intended presence with host nations to demonstrate U. S. 
determination to protect their interests and enforce international law. 
• Conduct engagement exercises with host nations involving the sites in 
order to acclimate our forces in the region. 
• Develop tactical doctrine for mutual support between the flotilla and 
Marine detachments in offensive, defensive, and sustainment operations. 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Li Jinming and Li Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China 
Sea: A Note,” School of Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University, Fujian, China, published in Ocean 
Development and International Law, 34, 2003, 287–295. 
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B. OPERATIONS IN OTHER REGIONS 
The next most important role for the flotilla is in the Arabian Sea and  
Persian Gulf. Low-cost deployment of one or two squadrons home ported at Bahrain, 
Jubail, or another friendly port seems preferable to exposing a carrier battle group 
(CVBG) in the Gulf. If Iran chooses to close the Strait of Hormuz, a flotilla of two or 
more squadrons on point to clear the way would be a great comfort to the U. S. blue 
water navy and mine clearance vessels. Currently, the only small combatants in the Gulf 
are lightly armed U. S. Navy and Coast Guard patrol craft. 
Small missile combatants, probably accompanied by littoral combat ships (LCSs), 
are better suited than blue water ships to operate in cul de sacs or confined waters 
elsewhere in the world. Joint operations with South Korea in the Yellow Sea to constrain 
North Korean mischief are a prominent example. Collaboration with Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia in the Black Sea is another. The Baltic Sea is another 
obvious location where the flotilla is better suited for cooperative action than a carrier 
battle group or expeditionary strike group. 
The flotilla is not intended to substitute for Offshore Patrol Vessels that are 
designed and better suited for maritime interdiction, drug interception, and antipiracy 
patrols. Nevertheless, flotilla vessels are more affordable and better assigned to these 
tasks than the large, blue water combatants currently being employed. 
Each region would entail a different kind of reconnaissance and logistic support, 
but in each case, these aspects seem relatively easy to work out affordably. 
C. SUMMATION 
Amidst a plethora of strategy books and policy documents in circulation today, 
how shall we give summary context for our war-at-sea strategy in which a flotilla and 
Marine outposts play their low-cost, high-reward roles? The late Rear Admiral (RADM) 
(Retired) J. C. “Bill” Wylie wrote late in life a never-published companion to his  
well-known, highly readable, and compact treatise on Military Strategy.23 Completed in 
1990, and entitled The Evolution of Maritime Strategy, the manuscript covers the period 
from the Middle Ages to post-World War II. Wylie’s purpose is to show which strategies 
worked and why. Appraising the Seven Years War, 1756-1763, he sums up with: 
As long as he [Prime Minister William Pitt, the elder] was in power the 
British never let up on either control of the French main fleets or control of the 
world’s trade and the money that that trade produced. In this war the key to sea 
power became clear: control of the main fleets; control of trade and money; and 
the recognition that both, not only the one or the other, are necessary. 
In his published book, Military Strategy, Wylie concludes that the general aim of 
strategy is to control something. In his unpublished work, he traces the advance from 
                                                 
23 Originally published in 1967, Military Strategy was republished in the Naval Institute’s Classics of Sea 
Power series in 1989, along with a Postscript written by Wylie and three other short works. An additional 
insight of Wylie’s that we teach to our Naval Postgraduate School students is that there are two kinds of 
campaigns, sequential and cumulative. A sequential one is like the 1943-44 Pacific Fleet’s island hopping 
in which each hop depended on the success of the previous island seizures. A cumulative one is a series of 
many events, none consequential in itself, but decisive when taken together, like the U. S. submarine 
campaign against Japanese shipping in 1943-45. 
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incoherent strategies in the Middle Ages to the successful ones in which explicitly or 
implicitly the winner knew what to control to win and then stuck to the winning 
strategy. 24  As a sailor, Wylie came to appreciate control of the seas—Mahan and 
Nicholas Spykman over Mackinder and Karl Haushofer—and he makes the case with 
demonstrations, as in the quotation above. 
The parallels must not be pressed. When T. X. Hammes speaks of offshore 
control he has one state in mind, China, and one set of partnerships in East and South 
Asia. Were our subject control as the aim of strategy in general, we must show the limits 
of maritime control as being necessary, but not sufficient in, for example, the American 
Civil War and both World Wars. We would have to address the threat of nuclear 
weapons, to which offshore operations contribute very little. We would recount in detail 
how a war-at-sea strategy against the Soviet Union was tested in the 1960s and why it 
failed. Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze sponsored a campaign analysis to test whether an 
asymmetric response to another Berlin blockade or suppressions in Hungary could be 
used to exploit our naval preponderance. The war-at-sea strategy, however, did not serve. 
NATO depended on control of the Atlantic sea lanes for commercial and military 
purposes, whereas the Soviet Union had no such critical vulnerabilities at sea and could 
build “cruisers”—submarines and land-based bombers—to disrupt or sever the critical 
Atlantic connection between North America and Western Europe. 
Wylie’s emphasis on control of trade, money, and the Chinese Navy, however, 
threatens Chinese prosperity and plays to American strengths. The offshore control 
strategy proposed in our Kline-Hughes essay, “Between Peace and Air-Sea Battle: A War 
at Sea Strategy,” does not examine the Sino-American competition as comprehensively 
as Wylie’s tour de monde, nor has anyone else described the strategic purposes and 
policy rewards that accompany each of our choices, from pacifism to strikes on mainland 
China. We think, however, that when this is done, the preference should be expressed as 
the best chance to “keep control” in the Western Pacific before a confrontation 
disintegrates into World War III. The best U. S. strategy against China will look much 
like William Pitt’s strategy in the Seven Years War. The Kline-Hughes essay makes a 
similar case for sea power to focus on the “control the world’s trade and the money that 
trade produces.” We think China will be wiser than France in 1756 and, seeing our 
advantage at sea, will not test—in Bill Wylie’s terms—who will control the situation. 
  
                                                 
24 Naval commentator Herbert Rosinski also emphasized control as the aim of strategy. 
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IV. SHIP AND FLOTILLA PROPERTIES 
Spruance believed a goal of perfection stifles timely decisions and inhibits 
the pace of action, whether in himself, his staff, his subordinates, or his 
peers. He had low regard for anyone who when judging effectiveness 
could not distinguish molehills from mountains. 
                Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.25 
The salvo equations, being generic, do not tell us the size of the ships being 
compared. The equations can be used to estimate the relative worth of striking power, 
defensive power, and staying power, but not ship size and cost. Insight into flotilla ship 
characteristics must come from their employments, described in Chapter III. The 
overriding capabilities are to confront the PLAN directly in its own seas and, if necessary, 
fight on the surface in China’s waters. In a war, the small combatants will try to conduct 
missile attacks against bigger warships. The combat crews must be as small as possible. 
When put out of action, Flotilla ships will normally be abandoned and should be designed 
without emphasis on damage control. Their concerted offense must be formidable and 
individual defenses affordable. Because combat missions are short and intense, full 
offensive targeting and defensive alertness can be assumed. In salvo equation terms: 
• Offensive and defensive alertness coefficients = 1.0. 
• Offensive power = Eight Harpoon-like missiles per ship with an expected 
hit probability of 0.8. 
• Defensive power = Two or three missiles defeated per defender. See a 
further discussion below. 
• Staying power = One hit by any ASCM will put a ship out of action. 
A. DESIGN OF A FLOTILLA WARSHIP 
Small missile ships—shall we call them Cushings?—can fight symmetrically 
against Chinese Houbeis and asymmetrically against larger warships.26 To win, they must 
out-scout the enemy and strike effectively first. 
One way to describe relative combat worth is by simple comparison of a Cushing 
with a big enemy combatant, similar to a DDG. To do so, we must know its size and Ship 
Construction Navy (SCN) cost. In Chapter I’s imaginary 1998 Battle of the Aegean, the 
then 15-year-old Cushings displaced 800 tons and the newer Phantoms 200 tons—the 
size of the first USS Cushing (TB-1) commissioned in 1890, or a modern PLAN 
                                                 
25 Wayne Hughes, “Clear Purpose, Comprehensive Execution: Raymond Ames Spruance (1886-1969),” 
in Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership During 
the 20th and Early 21st Centuries (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press), 62. 
26 Cushings were the key to victory in the imaginary “Second Battle of the Nile” and also were crucial to 
mission accomplishment in the “Battle of the Aegean.” The first American torpedo boat was Cushing  
(TB-1) named after the Civil War hero, William B. Cushing. Study contributor Hughes’ first assignment 
was to DD-797, the fourth ship to carry the name, and the fifth one, DD-985, was commanded by Jeffrey 
Kline, the principal investigator of this study. See Appendix B: Real and Imagined USS Cushings  
in History. 
 44 
Houbei 27. Our initial design will split the difference and assert that a 2012 Cushing 
displaces 500 tons. Thus, it is comparable to NPS’s Sea Lance design of 600 tons.28 The 
Sea Lance was rather carefully costed at $60 million in 2001 dollars. Today, the same 
design would probably cost $75 or $80 million, but the Sea Lance has expensive features, 
including a low-observable, wave-piercing, catamaran hull and 45 knots of speed. Our 
500-ton Cushing will have a simpler hull and 30 knots of speed, and eschew Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA) specifications required in bigger warships, and so it 
would probably cost the same as an average American warship, which is $115,000 per 
ton. 29  Therefore, we estimate that the U. S. Navy can procure each ship in series 
production for $60 million. 
A large enemy missile ship of 8,000 tons built at the world-wide average 
shipbuilding cost of not $115,000, but $92,000 per ton would cost about $730 million. If 
we pit equal cost forces of Cushings against these big missile ships, the Cushings’ 
numerical advantage would not be 3:1, but closer to 12:1. If the enemy ship costs as 
much as an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, i.e., $1.8 billion (B) of SCN, then the equal-
cost numerical relationship would pit one destroyer against 30 small missile ships.30 
There is no good reason to design a Cushing to perfection, as long as the aim is to 
keep the cost low, the crew small, and the offensive potency high. The design can take 
advantage of past surface missile battles by observing that the winners protected 
themselves successfully with soft kill and point defenses alone. Our Navy can exploit the 
design experience gained from the NPS Sea Lance, observe the features of the Chinese 
Houbei’s, and learn from the new 500-ton Republic of China (ROC) missile ship,  
Hsun Hai (Swift Sea). The battle-tested, first-generation, Israeli Sa’ar boats of 250 tons 
designed in 1970 are worth close study, not only to see why the original design was so 
combat-effective, but to observe the rapid learning and development processes in the 
Israeli Navy before and after it fought in 1973.31 Among many other designs to guide us 
are the Finnish Hamina’s (250 tons), Greek Roussan’s (600 tons), Swedish Visby’s  
(650 tons), French La Combattante FS-56 (400 tons), Norwegian Skjold’s (280 tons), 
Singaporean Victory’s (600 tons), and the U.S.-built Egyptian Ambassador III’s  
(500 tons). 
B. COMPOSITION OF THE FLOTILLA 
Hand-in-hand with individual ship design is the composition of the entire flotilla. 
We espouse a mutually supporting pair as the smallest tactical unit, a division comprising 
                                                 
27 TB-1displaced 120 tons, but the second-generation, American torpedo boats grew to around 250 tons. 
28 See Charles Calvano and Fotis Papoulias, “Sea Lance” Littoral Wafare Small Combatant System,” 
Naval Postgraduate School, Technical Report, NPS-ME-01-001, January 2001. 
29 Robert Nugent, “Global Naval Investment: The Hi-Lo Mix, Shipbuilding Trends, and Future Fleet 
Structures,” PowerPoint presentation for AMI International, Dubai, UAE, 4 July 2012 (Slide 6 has the  
raw data). 
30 Because the multipurpose Arleigh Burke is dense with equipment, its construction costs $225,000  
per ton. 
31 The Sa’ars grew in size because the Israelis need to deploy farther and carry a helicopter aboard for 
scouting. Currently, the Israeli Navy is contemplating a 2,800-ton German design, but for distant, blue 
water deployment, not for flotilla operations. The U. S. Navy’s problem is the opposite. We have blue 
water warships with ample range and air capabilities for distant operations, but need small combatants to 
fight and sometimes suffer losses in confined waters. 
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four ships, and a squadron of two divisions—eight vessels—as the basic building blocks. 
How many squadrons in the entire force? That depends on two things. First, how much of 
the U. S. fleet budget should go to coastal missile vessels? We suggest 2% or 3% of 
annual SCN as the investment’s upper limit. Second, how long will it take to become 
tactically and technologically proficient, so that we can proceed with affordable second- 
and third-generation designs? We think, at most, five years for a second-generation 
design and ten for the third-generation. 
We suggest a tentative fleet goal of eight squadrons, half of which would be based 
in East Asia. A force of 32 ships there will carry over 250 updated Harpoon- or Exocet-
like missiles, numerous additional short-range, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air 
missiles, and 32 medium-caliber, rapid-fire guns. The deployed vessels would be 
inefficient for land attack, but superb to create a no man’s land in the adjacent seas. A 
squadron or two of these vessels thrust into a hazardous peacekeeping operation would 
have a formidable tempering influence on Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the South and 
East China Seas. 
If conflict ensues, the flotilla’s purpose would change at once. The little ships 
would stalk and attack big PLAN surface warships and commercial traffic, probably with 
deadly effect. 
An entire flotilla of 64 Cushings should cost about $3.8 billion to build. That is 
the cost of two DDGs or half of one CVN air wing. If we specify a mere 16-year 
operating life, the 64 ships could be sustained indefinitely by building four Cushings per 
year at an annual SCN of $240 million. That is less than 2% of the announced SCN 
budget in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding program. We reiterate that we would not build 
64 Cushings of one design. After experience in tactical training and deployed operations, 
the Navy will build second- and third-generation designs that are affected by new 
technologies. Some of these technologies may be in response to surprise developments by 
the enemy. The introduction by the PLAN of small, inexpensive, radiation-seeking, 
autonomous aerial vehicles called Harpies is an example. The reason we want 16-year 
service lives is for rapid improvements not possible in big warships that must amortize 
their large construction costs over 30- and 40-year service lives. 
C. DEPLOYMENT AND ENDURANCE 
There are several ways a squadron can be deployed. One is to carry it in a large 
commercial vessel. The MV Tern recently carried four 1,400-ton Avenger-class mine 
countermeasures ships to the Persian Gulf. The same ship could easily lift eight or more 
Cushings of 500 tons when circumstances precluded their crossing the ocean. The MSC 
class minesweeper of 450 tons (crew 35) is of a different design and era, but in the 1950s 
it easily sailed independently, for example, from Charleston, South Carolina to  
New London and back in both fair and foul weather. A division of MSCs sailed from 
Charleston to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for refresher training, with a fuel stop in  
Fort Lauderdale. These were routine sailings. More unusual was the deployment of a 
squadron of five MSOs and MSCs from Long Beach to Pearl Harbor, thence to Midway 
Island, thence to Yokosuka without refueling at sea. After voyage repairs, one MSC, the 
Cormorant, sailed to Iwo Jima, conducted a mine clearance exercise, and then went to its 
new home port in Sasebo without refueling. These are reminders of the range of 
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operations that “small” U. S. ships commissioned in the 1950s were capable of.32 German 
500-ton U-boats sailed across the Atlantic in January 1942, sank shipping off Halifax, 
Boston, and New York, and returned to their bases on the Bay of Biscay without 
refueling. Within a few months, U-boats of 750 tons operated as far south as the  
Florida Strait and made Cape Hatteras a tanker graveyard until we commenced 
convoying off our East Coast.33 These events all took place more than 50 years ago. Can 
we not exploit modern technology to enhance the range and self-deployability of small 
combatants now? This might carry bigger rewards than 45 knots of speed. 
In any event, we expect that 500-ton Cushings will have the range to self-deploy 
to significant distances at economical cruising speeds. 
D. SUSTAINMENT AND SEAKEEPING 
The New Navy Fighting Machine Study derived an affordable fleet of over 600 
ships, about one-third of which were for green water operation, most of them small in 
size and tailored for specific tasks.34 The study, wisely as it turns out, did not add ships to 
the combat logistics support force (CLF), but retained the U. S. Navy’s existing force 
composition of about 30 CLF ships. We are now seeing the consequences of building 
LCSs and Joint High Speed Vehicles (JHSVs) for the fleet. Both classes are six times 
larger in displacement than flotilla vessels, yet because of their high speed, fuel 
consumption, and limited range, past methods of sustaining them do not work well for 
these and other small, deployed vessels such as PCs. We quote from a recent article by 
Captain David Meyers and Commander Jason Fitch in the Naval Institute Proceedings.35 
• Sustaining a steady production of both vessels in the years thereafter, this 
[existing] plan will culminate in a total of 66 LCSs and 41 JHSVs built by 
2040 with planned replacement for their 25- and 20-year service lives, 
respectively. These new, smaller ships will represent as many as 100 of 
the projected 301 ships in 30 years—a third of the Navy’s future fleet. 
• Because it is available and cost-effective, in-port replenishment, especially 
for refueling, is destined to be the foundation of logistics support for 
tomorrow’s small, high speed vessels. There are many options, however, 
for providing in-port support. 
                                                 
32  From Hughes’ personal recollections and those of his Naval Academy classmate,  
VADM William Rowden. 
33 We belabor transits here because we have often heard officers of all ranks say small ships do not have 
the range and cannot stand the weather for long transits. Here is one more anecdote from a book by  
Elmer Renner and Kenneth Birks, Sea of Sharks: A Sailor’s World War II Survival Story (Naval Institute 
Press: 2004). YMS 472, a 130-foot minesweeper designed for harbor protection, of 210 tons with a crew of 
36, had endurance for eight days of steaming without refueling. In 1945, it transited with other 
minesweepers from New York via Miami and Guantanamo Bay to the Panama Canal, thence to Long 
Beach with two fueling stops; thence via Pearl Harbor, Eniwetok, and Saipan to Okinawa—only to be sunk 
in a typhoon soon thereafter. 
34 Wayne Hughes et al., “The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between 
Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations and the Composition of the United States 
Fleet,” Naval Postgraduate School, Technical Report, NPS-OR-002-PR, August 2009. 
35 David C. Meyers and Jason B. Fitch, “Rethinking Littoral Logistics,” Naval Institute Proceedings, 
August 2012, 69–72. 
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The Meyer-Fitch essay goes on to illustrate the choices of in-port sustainment at 
length. We think the addition of two or three tenders to support flotilla combatants would 
be prudent for versatility, but our survey indicates that, in most instances, host nation 
support, piggy-backing onto their existing in-port replenishment facilities, will suffice. 
An article in the Naval Institute Proceedings, “22 Questions for Streetfighter,” shows 
why sustainment should be carefully thought out. The article addressed the procurement 
of tenders for an entire flotilla of 100 “streetfighters” that cost $80 million each, for a 
total of $8 billion. It says if a tender supports 10 deployed combatants and each one costs 
$500 million, then all 10 tenders’ procurement cost would be $5 billon. The article does 
not address manning, but a reasonable estimate is that 10 missile combatants will take 
250 personnel, yet their tender might take up to 400 personnel.36 Therefore, we favor a 
flexible approach similar to that of Meyer and Fitch, rather than a rigid plan, to support 
the entire flotilla with tenders. 
Further indicating the importance of logistics and sustainment, Keith Ho points to 
them as a potential Achilles’ heel. Unlike Meyer and Fitch, Ho assumes conventional 
underway replenishment and derives the need for three 25,000-ton, multiproduct, CLF 
ships, called Sea Quivers, to support 20 Sea Lance and 8 Sea Archers, each carrying 10 
aircraft. He adds a fourth Sea Quiver as the prudent number to sustain a 28-ship littoral 
task force. Ho suggests that the Sea Quivers, being few in number, easy to find, and less 
well-defended may be where an enemy should attack to neutralize the force.37 At the 
Naval Postgraduate School, “Red-Cell” students in the Joint Campaign Analysis class 
more than once have come to the same conclusion about the Blue fleet: the CLF is a 
critical vulnerability. 
Here is one highly flexible solution for flotilla support and Marine operations in 
the China Seas and elsewhere. Team an LCS with every four Cushings and exploit the 
JHSVs’ lift design to move the Marine detachments swiftly into forward outposts, along 
with their gear. Using such basic building blocks, a suitable number of mutually 
supporting ships and ground forces can be deployed very quickly. Two LCSs with each 
squadron of Cushings adds aerial reconnaissance that ought to suffice for peacetime 
surveillance. 
Why the great cost advantage of small combatants when conventional wisdom is 
that big ships enjoy economies of scale? A small, short-range ship’s advantage comes 
from avoiding the need to build-in the endurance that each DDG, LHA, and CVN enjoys. 
Long endurance and replenishments at sea from the CLF is the hallmark the  
U. S. Navy, but the advantage adds substantially to warship construction and operating 
costs without adding anything to their combat capabilities.38 
                                                 
36 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “22 Questions for Streetfighter,” Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2000,  
46–49. For comparative purposes, we assume manning of 25 for peacetime operations that include 
personnel for shipboard upkeep and training. For combat operations, we would reduce the manning to 
about 12 key personnel. 
37 Keith J. Ho, “An Analysis of Distributed Combat Systems” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 2001), 71–75. 
38  Nor does size add much to staying power in a battle. This is a change from when armor, 
compartmentation, and sheer size were expected to increase staying power. The evidence today is that it 
will only take one or two missile hits to put a 10,000-ton combatant out of action. 
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E. OPERATIONAL ADAPTABILITY 
It is important to remember there are two sides to policy negotiations that tend to 
be wheels within wheels of complex verbal maneuvers and posturing. A long-lived navy 
must be prepared to serve satisfactorily, whether the Sino-American relationship at the 
time is cooperation, competition, confrontation, or one that may lead to conflict. An 
American flotilla will be especially adaptable to the different policies. 
In times of cooperation, China can evidence good will with invitations for 
various-sized U. S. Navy warships to visit mainland ports and Hainan. Port calls by small 
ships in suitable numbers, accompanied by an LCS or two, will be particularly congenial 
toward fostering warm relations, performing most of the usual activities associated with 
friendly international “engagement.” 
In periods of competition, the flotilla would be exploited in joint exercises with 
allies like Japan, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea, and other East Asian countries 
whose friendships we value, to include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia,  
and Indonesia. 
Should a confrontation arise, divisions or squadrons of missile combatants, 
enhanced by aerial surveillance and often by Asian partners, can demonstrate a firm 
commitment to enforce international law. Flotilla ships are the best ones to risk when a 
surprise attack is possible and our forces are constrained to operate under strict Rules of 
Engagement. 
Flotilla employment during conflict would be radically different. Short-duration, 
surprise attacks on large ships at times and places of our choosing, using target detection 
and tracking from a variety of sources. 
F. TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTABILITY 
Because flotilla ships have narrower and more focused tasks, they will be easier to 
modify or replace when new technology offers room for improvement, or an adversary’s 
technology leap confronts us with a surprise. If replacement is more cost-effective than a 
conversion, it is far easier to replace flotilla ships than large, multipurpose ships with 
planned service lives of 30 or 40 years. The ships being replaced will probably be 
suitable in less critical operations with allies such as South Korea and the Baltic states. 
They can also be used for offshore patrol, maritime interdiction, antipiracy, and other 
less-demanding operations. 
G. SUMMARY OF SHIP AND FLOTILLA PROPERTIES 
A littoral combatant should have the following properties: 
1. Principal Armament 
About eight surface-to-surface missiles with a range of at least 60 nautical miles 
(NM). A longer ASCM range at low additional weight and cost is desirable, but we think 
for littoral waters the clutter of all descriptions will require sorting. Missiles must not be 
squandered on innocent traffic, and rapid, reliable identification and targeting contributes 
more to attacking effectively first at sea than sheer weapon range. (This would not be true 
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of offensive missiles in blue water frigates that fight on the open ocean. Their ASCMs 
should have a range of 100 NM or greater.) 
2. Staying Power 
One missile hit will put the vessel out of action. If the ship is immobilized, then 
the surviving crew members must be rescued by the ship’s consort, sometimes in very 
hazardous conditions. No damage control will be attempted because the loss is affordable 
and additional crew members may be lost while trying to save their ship. We think there 
will be instances, perhaps a surprisingly large number of them, in which missiles are 
expended and a gun duel ensues, or a battle is fought at short range against a swarming 
attack at short range with gunfire a critical part of it. Staying power for a gunfight  
is valuable. 
3. Defense Capabilities 
Point defense missiles and gunfire are the best active defense. Most successes in 
combat, however, have been with passive defenses—decoys, jamming, and stealth 
properties—and by evasive maneuvers. As a prospective new technology, we think 
“electronic smoke screens” developed by the U. S. Army are promising and should be 
pursued for obscuring ships from missile seekers. Of course, the smaller the ship being 
screened, the easier it is to cover it with electronic smoke.39 
A Cushing’s characteristics and functions in peace and war have been narrowly 
defined. Other green water operations around the world will often need different 
functions performed, but not by the flotilla of missile combatants. 
• Inshore combatants that sometimes also serve in the riverine force. These 
vessels are currently being built, quickly added to the inshore fleet, and 
experience is being gained. 
• Offshore patrol vessels to conduct patrol, interdiction, and antipiracy 
operations more economically than by a blue water ship. A Cushing is 
imperfect for the role, but it is much less expensive than a DDG. We can 
also solicit assistance from our friends in some places around the world. 
• Mine clearance is in flux. It is an important capability we must have, but 
cost-effectively. 
• Naval gunfire support (NGFS) will need to be reviewed in the light of 
twenty-first century technologies and tasks. The NGFS mission should not 
be piggy-backed on missile ships, but should have its own dedicated 
gunships, well trained and equipped with modern means of supporting 
ground operations, such as rail guns. 
• Air operations for reconnaissance, close air support, and strike are 
essential complements to the flotilla, just as they are for blue water 
warships. 
                                                 
39 The adaptation of an Army program of obscurants to conceal ships from missile seekers was first 
proposed by Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) B. J. Morash in a paper for the Halsey Group, Naval War 
College, dated 11 December 2005, and approved by his mentor, Professor James Fitzsimonds. Electronic 
smoke has not been pursued by the U. S. Navy, perhaps because it would be hard to conceal a ship as big as 
an LHA or DDG that must radiate to defend itself. Flotilla-sized ships in a tactical formation would rarely 
need to radiate through the “cloud,” however, and probably can be covered well enough to give an enemy a 
sense of doubt and insecurity. 
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• Inshore ASW is a heavy burden that has been put on the LCS and may 
need to be reviewed. The need may be less critical when flotilla-sized 
ships are the only shallow water targets, while the submarine threat is 
being reduced by U. S. submarines and ASW aircraft. 
H. IMPENDING ROLES FOR UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES IN THE 
FLOTILLA 
Aerial unmanned vehicles are being infused in all aspects of twenty-first century 
military operations. Experimentation at NPS extends to the hardware and software of 
autonomous vehicles, with emphasis on autonomous aircraft that cooperate with each 
other. The experimental evidence is consistent with the salvo equation conclusion that 
smaller, less expensive, and more numerous autonomous aerial vehicles offer the best 
single reward for combat and other operations. Advances in control systems, 
accompanied by cost reductions, are being made so swiftly as to boggle the mind. One 
prominent goal at NPS is to offset the threat of inexpensive swarms of Chinese Harpies 
with rapidly deployable counterswarms to destroy them in the air. Undersea 
experimentation in autonomous vehicles for a variety of purposes is also being vigorously 
pursued. 
Thus, one must not think that a manned U. S. Navy flotilla is cutting edge. It is in 
fact remedial—a program of catch up that the Navy has talked about for at least 20 years 
without taking action. Experience with 500-ton, austerely manned missile combatants is 
the first step, but very soon—within a decade—part of the mix of offshore combatants 
can very easily include unmanned systems, including those that decoy, scout without risk 
to humans, carry medium- and short-range missiles, and sometimes operate 
autonomously. 
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V. OPERATING AND FIGHTING A FLOTILLA 
To attack effectively (by means of superior concentration) and to do so 
first (with longer-range weapons, an advantage in maneuver, or shrewd 
timing based on good scouting) have been the warp and woof of all  
naval tactics. 
                Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.40 
A. BATTLE HISTORY AS LABORATORY 
The Battle of the Aegean in Chapter I shows the complexity and uniqueness of 
every real battle. The stylized salvo equations in Chapter II show that even in a sea 
battle’s simplified essence, a tactical commander must monitor 10 key decision variables 
over which he has influence of (at best) only five. 
The salvo equations are descriptive. They do not tell a tactical commander how to 
act. To introduce the precepts of successful flotilla operations and tactics, we must 
describe the processes of combat. Unlike ground combat, the essential processes of 
modern naval combat are only two: scouting and shooting. The two processes are 
governed by a third, the command and control (CC) process. The enemy must also carry 
out the same three processes: scout, CC, and shoot. Both sides also attempt to interfere 
with the enemy—slow or break his chain of actions—by “antiscouting,”  
CC-countermeasures, and a complicated set of defensive actions Hughes calls 
“counterforce.”41 The tactical goal is to attack the enemy first and do sufficient harm that 
he cannot win or, in the best of circumstances, cannot do us any harm at all. Thus, we see 
that the two simple processes, scout and shoot, in comprehensive tactical execution 
become 12 in all. A CC network attempts to oversee six processes, including itself, more 
effectively (not necessarily faster) than the enemy. 
B. MILESTONES IN SALVO WARFARE 
1942-43: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign is one of the most instructive 
examples in all naval history of ground-air-sea warfare between two accomplished 
opponents. Among the campaign’s many lessons, it first exhibited the decisive use of 
destroyer torpedo salvoes, frequently when fighting against cruisers six times bigger. To 
summarize what was a long series of night surface battles, first, in 1942, during the 
pivotal fight for Guadalcanal, in each battle the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) repeatedly 
won or held their own, often with astute use of very large torpedo salvoes, despite the fact 
that the U.S. Navy (USN) forces usually gained first detection and often shot first—with 
gunfire. Throughout the six-month struggle, we were forced to assemble pick-up forces 
that were seldom led twice by the same tactical commander. It is no exaggeration to say 
                                                 
40 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Naval Institute Press: 2000), 43. 
41 Not to be confused with the peculiar use of the term in nuclear war planning, when “counterforce” 
means an offensive strike to destroy an enemy threat. 
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that under these circumstances we were doomed to use repeatedly the only tactics we 
were practiced at, a long column of ships intended for long-range daylight surface actions 
between capital ships. Moreover, we had not learned to use our radar advantage 
efficiently. Then, after the pause between the end of the Guadalcanal campaign in 
January 1943 and the beginning of our swift march up the Solomon Island chain through 
the latter half of 1943, we had time to bring in a new set of leaders with continuity, 
notably Rear Admiral “Tip” Merrill and Commanders Arleigh Burke and Frederick 
Moosbrugger. Burke is credited with perceiving that our radar advantage could best be 
exploited in surprise attacks by employing torpedo salvoes as the decisive weapon. He 
developed two-prong tactics that won two near-perfect battles at Vella Gulf, on  
7 August 1943, and at Cape St. George, on 25 November 1943. The Battle of Empress 
Augusta Bay, on 2 November 1943, is instructive because when the U. S. force of 
cruisers and destroyers under Merrill was split into three components, the battle 
deteriorated into a semimelee. The Japanese were surprised and confused, and the result 
was an American strategic victory, but the battle is a reminder that with salvoes of 
torpedoes in the water or in prospect, order can deteriorate into chaos, in which large 
combatants are more likely to be victims, rather than be successful with their large 
gunpower. The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign is worth careful study to this day, not 
least because it is a case study in what it takes for the command process to blend the 
processes of scouting and shooting into a deadly, decisive, tactical system.42 
1971: The Indo-Pakistan War indicated that a fleet in port is no longer safe 
from surface missile attack. The Royal Navy’s aerial torpedo attack on battleships at 
Taranto in 1940 and the IJN’s aerial attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 demonstrated that 
ships were no longer safe in port. Now we know they can be attacked by surface ship and 
submarine-launched missiles as well. On 4 December 1971, at the outbreak of the war, 
three Indian missile patrol boats escorted by destroyers bombarded the port of Karachi in 
a surprise attack. Seven Styx missiles were fired toward the port and six found targets. 
Two Pakistani destroyers on patrol near the entrance were hit. One was sunk and the 
other was severely damaged. A minesweeper was also sunk and fuel tanks and command 
facilities destroyed. These modern vulnerabilities make “a fleet in being” a questionable 
strategy for an inferior navy. 
1973: The Arab-Israeli War was the most intense period of fighting between 
small vessels that included missile combat.  A summary of 14 incidents between 5 and 21 
October 1973 has been compiled by one our foremost authorities on inshore combat, 
Captain Benjamin Yates, USNR. 43  The Israeli Navy dominated by its use of 
comprehensive training, preplanned tactics, well-thought-out doctrine, and effective soft 
kill systems tailored to the SS-N-2 Soviet missile used by Egypt and Syria; this, despite 
the fact that the Styx severely outranged Israel’s Gabriel ASCMs. Scouting was 
sometimes enhanced by land-based radar, but coauthor Hughes found no evidence of 
aerial scouting on either side, nor was participation of aircraft mentioned in his 
                                                 
42  There are many superb accounts of individual battles each well worth reading, but the best 
comprehensive look at the entire campaign, with emphasis on the U. S. and Japanese tactics and containing 
estimates of torpedoes fired in each battle, is by Thomas J. McKearney, “The Solomons Naval Campaign: 
A Paradigm for Surface Warships in Maritime Strategy” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
September 1985). 
43 Benjamin S. Yates, “David vs. Goliath: Small Boat Challenges to Naval Operations in Coastal Waters” 
(Master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1998). 
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discussions with the Israeli Navy.44 An excellent appraisal of the lessons learned is found 
in the thesis by Singaporean student, LT Keith Ho.45 Among his observations are: 
• Larger ships, with longer-range weapons and standoff capability, are not 
invulnerable to attacks. 
• Risk is inevitable in every battle. The Israelis treated their ships as 
“combat consumables.” The same cannot be said of fleets structured 
around a few platforms comprising all the fleet’s fire power. 
• Numbers reduce the possibility of catastrophic loss. 
Any tactical training course to prepare an American flotilla for combat operations should 
include a comprehensive review of naval tactics in the Yom Kippur War. 
1982: Falklands War was not about flotilla actions, but it deserves close study as 
the most significant recent maritime campaign. The campaign is notable for the 
dominance of very effective Exocet missiles launched by aircraft or from land, and also 
for the disproportionate influence of a very small number of submarines on both sides. A 
superb memoir of the campaign is One Hundred Days, by the operational commander, 
Admiral Sandy Woodward, who often served as his own tactical commander.46 It is a 
personal description of the constant tension and pressures on a theater commander in the 
missile age of naval warfare at sea and on land. 
Present Day: North Korea/South Korea skirmishes are not salvo warfare, but 
have many characteristics of flotilla combat in a war at sea. Part fury, part frustration, the 
extended series of clashes exhibit two nations attempting to protect sovereignty claims in 
the Yellow Sea, and South Korean actions to block North Korean attempts to infiltrate 
South Korea by sea on both sides of the peninsula. This extended, undeclared conflict is 
worth the study of sturdy sailor performance under fire, the scouting methods employed, 
and the results of deadly skirmishes, including a submarine attack. 
C. BASIC INSIGHTS FOR MODERN MISSILE WARFARE 
Surprise attacks are easier to make in littoral waters and will be more frequent 
there. Coastal clutter makes concealment easier and scouting less certain. A tactical 
commander must often coordinate by fighting instructions and battle plans sometimes 
executed silently without signal. 
Two departures from the missile salvo mindset are: when air superiority is at issue 
and when early expenditure of all ASCMs leads to a gun duel. 
ASW tactics are different from surface tactics and take forms of analysis that 
emphasize the detection, classification, and localization processes. 
                                                 
44 One of the commanding officers showed Hughes a 35mm motion picture of a two-Styx attack from an 
Osa or Komar at night near Port Said. His ship had been detected by Egyptian shore-based radar and the 
action starts with two bright bursts when the ASCMs are launched from over 25 miles away. The traces of 
the missiles can be followed as streaks of light as they approach, serving as a vivid reminder of what it is 
like to experience “rounds incoming.” The missiles exceeded their nominal 25-mile range, but missed  
their target. 
45 Keith J. Ho, “An Analysis of Distributed Combat Systems” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 2001), 89–93. 
46 Sandy Woodward and Patrick Robinson, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle 
Group Commander (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, MD, 1992). 
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Attack modes for salvo warfare at sea can be concentrated, dispersed, or 
sequential. The preference depends on radiation doctrine, the strength of the defense, the 
availability of off-board scouting, and the likelihood of successful surprise on either side. 
A dispersed, but simultaneous, attack looks best from a theoretical point of view. For a 
detailed discussion see Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, pp. 266–293. 
Whether to concentrate in one or more formations is a many-faceted decision, but, in 
general, massing a force is only wise when the defense is very strong because of the 
collective mutual support by semiindependent, automatic actions. During and since 
World War II, the choice of concentrating for defense has been based on all screening 
ships defending their neighbors by defending themselves.47 
D. MAINTAINING STOCKS OF MISSILES, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER 
ORDNANCE 
The U. S. Navy should estimate the adequacy of our reserve stockpiles of 
weapons and also the number and types carried in ships or aircraft. In the Falklands War, 
one of the unexpected results—that tactical analysis would have anticipated—was the 
large number of torpedoes, about 250 of them, fired at false contacts against an enemy 
order of battle of one effective Argentine diesel submarine. Every campaign analysis and 
training exercise should count weapon “expenditures.” In general, the offense has an 
advantage over the defense by threatening to drain the defender dry of defensive 
weapons. The aforementioned Chinese Harpies are very low cost, autonomous, aerial 
vehicles whose purpose is to do just that. 
One offensive missile can require several SAMs and point defense shots in 
response. Soft kill defense is the opposite: one chaff cloud may distract several incoming 
missiles. A seldom mentioned advantage of many small attacking combatants is to 
impose the need for the enemy to fire at many targets, expanding the number of apparent 
targets, especially if each defender deploys multiple decoys.48 This is the same principle 
that made Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) such a complicating factor 
when defending against intercontinental or long-range ballistic missiles. A swarm attack 
by small, deadly, surface vessels or unmanned aerial combat vehicles imposes similar 
problems of saturating defenders with targets that can consume all the defender’s 
“bullets.” 
A good measure of effectiveness for ships that may come under attack and defend 
themselves is “maximum delivered firepower over the combat life of the ship”; thus, a 
dilemma. A big ship armed with many missiles so that it will not run out while defending 
itself will, if put out of action by an ASCM leaker, lose the use of all its other missiles not 
yet fired. 
                                                 
47  In the Falklands War, the opposite happened. A screening ship, HMS Ambuscade, operating 
automatically and doctrinally, fired chaff that deceived both of two approaching Exocets fired by Argentine 
Entendard aircraft. Its chaff protected the screening ship as intended, but with the unintended consequence 
that the Exocets sought another target and destroyed one of the ships being protected, the Atlantic 
Conveyer. 
48  The quantitative effectiveness has been calculated by this study’s principal investigator,  
Jeffrey R. Kline, in “Exploring Effects of Countertargeting in Naval Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
unpublished essay, 2008. 
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E. DEVELOPING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS 
Distributed forces can operate almost silently by fighting instructions (i.e., tactical 
doctrine). Only a few ships need radiate at a time. Small missile ships also can operate 
silently under a battle plan, as the Phantoms did in the fictitious Battle of the Aegean. In 
coastal operations, British MGBs, MTBs, and U. S. PT Boats consistently conducted 
attacks with few or no radio transmissions. American destroyers’ coastal operations in the 
Solomons are instructive. Their tactical advantage depended on radar emissions that, in 
most instances, the Japanese could not exploit. Today, a flotilla’s flexibility is greatly 
enhanced because missiles extend its lethal range by at least an order of magnitude over 
the torpedo and gun ranges of World War II. 
F. DETECTION, TRACKING, AND TARGETING 
For twenty years, U. S. Navy forces of all descriptions have been able to take for 
granted air superiority on both sides of a coastline. Now, against China, we must expect a 
period of intense competition to achieve command of the air. Meanwhile, surface naval 
forces will be confronted with new targeting challenges to attack effectively first. This is 
most evident inside the first island chain and a principal reason why flotilla vessels are 
the only surface ships that should be risked while air ascendency is being contested. 
Alternative scouting methods include helicopters and UAVs, submarines and 
UUVs at “periscope depth,” unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and covert scouts that 
are masked to look like fishing boats or coastal traders. Big warships can neither be 
concealed at sea nor defend themselves without their electronic emissions being 
detectable at long range. A distributed squadron of Cushings, however, will be hard to 
detect in fishing fleets that usually ply their trade even in wartime. They can duck in and 
out from behind islands. They can camouflage under trees in inlets amidst the 10,000 or 
more islands that rim the China Seas, waiting for the right moment to shoot their missiles 
at long range, or venture forth to attack. Learning how to conduct time-sharing radiation 
plans or use decoys that radiate ostentatiously to first draw attention and then go silent—
these will be part of the tactical development process in the flotilla, once it is built and 
deployed. 
Cushings should be designed and trained for networked targeting rather than with 
their own sensors. In essence, we envision a “cooperative engagement capability,” but 
without technological complexity and at modest cost, using tactical procedures for 
coordination and minimum communications. Flotilla operations are particularly well 
suited for bistatic and multistatic search, in which one ship transmits radar pulses and the 
returns are picked up by the receivers of other ships that do not, themselves, transmit. The 
technology is at least 35 years old and should be easy to adapt. 
We do not know what air war strategists believe about a war in the air with China. 
At its outset, the war above the sea probably will be so intense that surface surveillance 
by aircraft on both sides will be hampered. Flotilla operations will be hazardous, of 
course, but not to the degree that a CVBG or Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) will 
draw fire from Chinese missiles and aircraft. In worst case circumstances of near 
dominance by Chinese air, the flotilla would still be able to conceal itself for a substantial 
time, moving from inlet to inlet, and firing its long-range missiles to harass Chinese 
shipping without venturing far offshore. The flotilla’s first priority would often be to 
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prevent Chinese amphibious ships from easy occupation of key islands and help protect 
the Marine outposts from attack. 
G. SUBMARINE THREATS 
We have disregarded submarines as a threat to high-speed, 500-ton missile craft 
partly because they are difficult and not very lucrative targets, and partly because we 
believe Chinese submarines will be intensely preoccupied with our own SSNs operating 
in their waters. This relative security from attack would not be true of our carriers and 
amphibious ships. Wherever they operate, until the Chinese submarine threat is reduced, 
big ships will require old fashioned screening of the kind not seen since Soviet 
submarines were a serious threat. 
H. INTRODUCING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
New technologies, such as laser weapons, unmanned undersea systems, rail guns, 
and electronic smoke screens will be easier to install in single-purpose warships than in 
multipurpose ships, which can perform no functions while a new technology is being 
installed to improve one of its functions. Short service life and continuous acquisition of 
four or more vessels each year will accelerate the deployment of new technologies in 
Cushings and their successors. Costly back-fitting during overhauls should be rare. 
I. TRAINING AND TACTICAL COMPETENCE 
We quote from Mark R. Peattie’s book, Sunburst, on the comprehensive subject 
of the Japanese Navy’s preparations for a war with the United States. Regarding the need 
to change swiftly from a battleship-centric fleet to a carrier-centric fleet in  
World War II, Peattie observed,49 
Although important consideration was ultimately given by the staff of the 
Combined Fleet to the problem of fleet air defense, too many years had been 
wasted in ignoring the problem to work out an effective air defense in the short 
time remaining before hostilities began. There were a number of reasons for this 
neglect. [One was] the importance of fleet air defense was given little serious 
study in the 1920s and 1930s because the navy’s traditional obsession with 
offensive operations blinded it to all other considerations. 
One does not have to believe that the U. S. Navy of today will shift to a more distributed 
fleet at the onset of a conflict to see that a flotilla, to be viable, must be trained and ready 
for both strike and self-defense. 
Flotilla warfare requires unique skills, with many variations depending on the 
geographical location, enemy, and purpose. We have indicated some of these skills: 
exploitation of land masking and radar ducting, and concealment amidst fishing boats, 
inlets, small islands, or oil rigs. We believe, however, that it will be easier to train to and 
perform one or two narrowly focused functions expertly, as the Israeli Navy did before 
the 1973 War. 
                                                 
49 Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941 (Naval Institute Press: 
Annapolis, 2001), 155. 
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Here is a more personal comment by the Director of NPS’s unmanned vehicle 
experimentation program: “Flotilla sailors will be ready when they think of themselves as 
Tigers of the Sea who blend into the jungle of coastal clutter and pounce unexpectedly on 
larger ships.” Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Commander U. S. Fleet Forces Command, 
elegantly endorsed the purpose of a recently established International Littoral Operations 
Center for education and research with: “Littoral Warfare is the Mixed Martial Arts of 
Joint and Coalition Warfighting, and success in that very complex and dynamic 
battlespace requires that the U. S. Navy possess a black belt.” 
J. CHINA-SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN PEACE AND WAR 
There is a sharp distinction in operational modes between peacetime presence to 
constrain the PLAN and a wartime environment if deterrence fails. 
1. In Peacetime 
The flotilla’s most important employment is to patrol in the maritime coastal 
regions where China aspires to achieve dominance. 
• The overriding purpose is enforcement of international law, but in a high-
tension environment; 
• employed to confront Chinese patrol vessels or small combatants directly; 
• week-long, day and night deployments with a crew of 24; 
• overt operations with unconstrained communications; 
• unconstrained surveillance and reconnaissance using open employment of 
all means of detecting, tracking, and communicating, including satellites; 
• movement at fuel-efficient cruising speeds; 
• Rules of Engagement that are a severe constraint and self-imposed hazard; 
• constant cooperation with host nations and allies; and 
• frequent aircraft over-flight and tracking by both sides. The shooting war 
may start in the air. 
A second employment may be to escort critical merchant ship traffic into friendly ports 
with less constraining rules of engagement and probably maritime exclusion zones. 
Convoy operations will be well within attack range from the China mainland, from 
aircraft or ballistic missiles. Flotilla ships are better put to at risk in these confrontations 
than DDGs or CGs. 
2. In Wartime 
The major flotilla employment shifts to short-duration, deadly hit-and-run attacks. 
In effect, the flotilla conducts its own guerre de course to make the China Seas unsafe for 
all surface traffic. 
• The primary aim is to troll for the big fish, avoiding small enemy 
combatants, leaving them to circumstances when surprise can be achieved, 
or by aircraft strikes; 
• with well-planned, silent operations, often at night; 
• passive reconnaissance by unusual scouts and scouting methods; 
• satellites for surveillance may have been destroyed; 
• a combat crew of 12 only; 
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• each strike is at a time and in sea states and weather of our choosing; 
• no concern for Rules of Engagement; freedom to strike quickly and 
withdraw; 
• concealment is often by moving slowly amidst innocent traffic; 
• deception by a single, noisy, manned or unmanned decoy vessel 
employing high speed and electronic radiation; and 
• strike-fighter aircraft on both sides will likely first and foremost be 
devoted to the competition for air superiority over the China Seas and not 
be fundamental participants in the surface actions. 
Sea battles, once the missiles fly, are essentially maneuver-free. A twenty-first century 
fleet must fight in the formation it is in. Combat “maneuvering” is embedded in the high-
speed missiles and the strike aircraft.50 Tactical maneuvering by warships takes place 
during the scouting phase of the battle. 
Gun duels may occur. In the 1973 War, when the Egyptian Osa’s and Komar’s 
salvoed all their SS-N-2 Styx missiles to no effect, they turned and fled. An Israeli friend 
said that that was probably a bad decision. If they had closed at maximum speed, some 
might have survived the dash and done some harm with guns before being sunk. As it 
was, the tail chase with a five-knot closing speed gave the Israeli Sa’ar boats the time to 
aim carefully for maximum effect. When retired Admiral Arleigh Burke was given a tour 
of his namesake, the DDG-51, he was asked if there was anything in the design he would 
have changed. Reportedly he said, yes, he would have liked to see a brace of cutlasses in 
the wardroom. More than likely he was reminding his listeners of his experience in the 
short-range battles in the upper Solomons, battles that were full of surprises and fought at 
close range. 
As was the purpose of a guerre de course—a guerilla war at sea—in the past, the 
purpose of the flotilla and Marine outposts in wartime is to impose unsafe regions in 
China’s own home waters. Precisely to the extent that China threatens to deny access we 
would threaten to deny it access, creating a no man’s land that disadvantages China far 
more than any other state or commercial enterprise. 
K. SUMMARY 
Building and deploying a flotilla of 64 or more small missile combatants is the 
single most promising way to quickly enhance surface warfare capabilities against China. 
• It requires a very low cost, very low risk procurement decision. 
• Teaming with LCSs will give the Cushings air reconnaissance in 
peacetime and for edge-of-war operations. 
• A variety of scouting modes are possible, should war ensue. 
• The Marine outposts will be a powerful, multifaceted manifestation of 
expeditionary warfare, leading to new modes of cooperation and 
coordination between Marine detachments and new Navy ships, 
representatively LCS, JHSV, and flotilla vessels. 
                                                 
50 Tactics, operations, and strategy will all be affected greatly by which side is ahead in the battle for 
control of the air space. Failure to achieve air superiority will have major implications that far exceed 
concern for the flotilla’s survival. 
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VI. FIFTEEN FINDINGS AND ONE CONCLUSION 
1. The U. S. Navy is peerless at designing and operating multimission, blue water 
ships. For green water, however, we must understudy the best designs and tactics 
of the best foreign coastal navies. The time it takes to match their capabilities is 
not the time to build the ships. It is the time needed to train the force for 
operations in peace and develop effective tactics for war. Our navy ought to move 
quickly to develop first generation designs, capabilities, and combat tactics that 
are integrated with scouting methods. 
2. A flotilla of about 64 “Cushings,” of which 32 are deployed to East Asia, is a very 
low-cost way to complicate PLAN operations in the China Seas. A fleet of 64 is, 
we suggest without proof, about right as a low-cost critical mass. Its steady state 
cost requires only 2% of the published future annual SCN, even assuming 
replacement after a short, 15-year service life. 
3. The U. S. Navy does not need to improve on the best foreign designs. The first 
generation Cushings we espouse (of 500 tons, carrying eight offensive missiles, a 
dozen or more short-range missiles, extensive soft kill defenses, and a 57 mm 
gun) will be similar to the best missile combatants of other navies. 
4. There are alternatives to 500-ton Cushing vessels. We chose one class of 500 tons 
initially because this size can be fought with a small crew; it will be offensively 
potent; it can be sent without hesitation in harm’s way; it can be abandoned when 
put out of action, saving the small crew; and it has a respectable radius of action 
for offensive operations in the Yellow, East, and South China Seas. With 
experience, our operating forces can recommend better second- and third-
generation designs. 
5. For East Asia, prepare now to establish Marine outposts at preplanned locations in 
the first island chain. The minimal purpose is as covert listening posts. Bigger 
outposts will fire land-to-sea missiles. The flotilla, once built and deployed, will 
operate conjointly from the same wartime locations in mutual support between 
flotilla and Marine detachments. Peacetime engagement activities with friendly 
states should be conducted now to anticipate combined occupation of these key 
outposts and to confirm U. S. intentions to stay the course in East Asia. It is far 
easier to defend an island outpost than to take it after it has been occupied by the 
enemy who has built up its defenses. 
6. One or two flotilla squadrons would be a valuable presence in the Persian Gulf. 
Flotilla vessels are also much more suitable than large, blue water ships for 
operations in other cul de sacs around the world, for example, in support of South 
Korea in the Yellow Sea; Georgia, Turkey, Rumania, and Bulgaria in the Black 
Sea; Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean; or Sweden, Finland, and other states in 
the Baltic. 
7. If past experience is a reliable guide, deployment of flotilla ships to a theater of 
operations will pose few challenges. The vessels can deploy themselves without 
refueling at sea. On special occasions a squadron of eight might be carried to the 
desired location by one leased large commercial carrier ship. Deployment will not 
be a significant constraint on flotilla freedom of action. 
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8. Sustainment is very theater dependent. We suggest that for East Asia the flotilla 
should be home ported in Sasebo, Okinawa; Subic Bay, Zamboanga; or 
Singapore, for swift movement in a crisis to preplanned Marine outposts in the 
first island chain. For patrolling off Africa, tender support is indicated. For the 
European theater, existing U. S. bases or quickly established host nation support 
will serve. For Latin America, either tender or host nation support is indicated. 
9. Sea keeping is not an issue. Throughout history, inshore coastal combatants have 
exploited foul weather and dark of night for concealment and stealthy approaches. 
Then, the small vessels needed to close to torpedo or gun range; now, a modern 
flotilla often can lurk in sheltered waters, attacking with its long-range missiles. 
10. An element that begs for development is the best way to conduct theater-specific 
scouting (or “ISR”). A flotilla opens up new opportunities and scouting methods 
for reporting enemy movements, from small, innocent-looking “coastal traders,” 
up to sophisticated, unmanned vehicles. The availability of aerial 
reconnaissance—or satellites—cannot be taken for granted at the onset of 
hostilities, but small combatants will be more adaptable in these uncertain 
conditions. 
11. Command and control is also wide open for development for missile combat. 
Combat doctrine and training to fight under highly disciplined, often-silent, 
minimum-control conditions is indicated. Paradoxically, a dispersed fleet of many 
small combatants conducting offensive strikes needs less electronic radiation 
(radar and radio) than does a carrier battle group or expeditionary strike group, 
neither of which can perform its mission without radiating intensely. 
12. Defenses, whether for large, blue water warships or flotilla-sized ships, will 
require continuing attention as ASCMs and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) 
become hotter. A realistic appraisal of leaker probabilities is vital. For potential 
conflicts with a small number of states, the possibility of running out of missiles 
is real, whether the danger is for individual ships in battle, for individual task 
forces, or for the entire fleet. Large numbers of small combatants dilute an enemy 
attack and force him to increase his missile expenditures. USVs and other decoys 
may be the most effective future countermeasures to reduce the hazard of being 
sucked dry of defensive missiles. 
13. Small combatants are an excellent hedge against an adversary’s tactical or 
technological surprises, once a cadre of officers and sailors has been trained to 
exploit new capabilities and counter the enemy’s. 
14. Because flotilla operations are so dependent on region and threat, the single most 
important Navy decision will be to establish a flotilla type command under a 
senior admiral to pursue combat readiness anywhere. The command is  
necessary to: 
• foster sound designs; 
• develop an experienced corps of officers and enlisted professionals; 
• cooperate with special forces and Marine detachments; 
• develop theater-specific training, support, and reconnaissance; 
• collaborate with the blue water fleet; and 
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• engage international partners at the most important locations around  
the world. 
15. We believe a flotilla is not necessary for the U. S. government to announce a new 
national strategy of “offshore control.” The flotilla, once built, however, will quickly 
become the force component that competes most directly with China’s surface fleet. In 
some circumstances, it may be our first choice to confront Chinese maritime hegemonic 
ambitions, in peace and war. 
A. CONCLUSION 
It is hard to imagine another U. S. defense program so well-hedged with fall backs and 
replete with possible extensions. The small missile combatants are easy to design, entail 
no new technologies in the first generation, are quickly built, and are eminently 
affordable. Mistakes made will quickly be uncovered in operations at sea. More 
contractors can compete and change orders need not lead to cost growth. If the flotilla 
fails to contribute to influencing and constraining China, it is still useful in the Yellow 
Sea, Persian Gulf, Black Sea, and other cul de sacs. Offshore control does not depend on 
a successful flotilla as it did for our imaginary Admiral Grant in the Battle of the Aegean. 
Marine outpost development has no dollar costs except for the small one to adapt surface-
to-surface missiles for land-to-sea warfare. Unless the Cushing designs are utter failures, 
international sales and foreign aid will hasten cost reductions and other improvements. 
Ship design changes as radical as 200-ton Phantoms or enlarged Sea Shadow stealth-ship 
designs of about 1,000 tons are alternatives, should Cushings somehow be the  
“wrong size.” 
Risks seem far-fetched, but must be mentioned. Junior officers may not wish to 
stake their careers on becoming experts at littoral warfare. NAVSEA construction 
standards for big warships, such as for damage control and habitability, must not be 
mindlessly applied. Flotilla ships might unimaginatively be seen as a threat, rather than as 
a complement, to LCS designs. Logistical support might be hampered by a Pentagon 
proclivity to program one solution to fit all circumstances. Pressure for traditional, large, 
multipurpose ships might inappropriately distort the streetfighter concept by burdening 
Cushings with expensive complexity, excessive automation, and an attitude that no ship 
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APPENDIX A. THE SALVO EQUATIONS: THEIR STRUCTURE 
AND APPLICATIONS 
The basic mathematical equations described in words in Chapter II are: 
∆𝐵 =  𝛼𝐴 −𝑏3𝐵
𝑏1
  𝛼 = 𝑎2𝑃ℎ𝑎 
∆𝐴 =  𝛽𝐵 − 𝑎3𝐴
𝑎1
  𝛽 =  𝑏2 𝑃ℎ𝑏 
A, B  =  the number of combat units 
𝑎1 , 𝑏1  =  the number of hits to put a unit out of action 
𝑎2 ,𝑏2  =  the number of shots/ship-salvo 
𝑎3 ,𝑏3  =  the number of enemy shots eliminated/ship 
𝑃ℎ𝑎 ,𝑃ℎ𝑏  =  the probability that a shot is well-aimed and can hit 
Many embellishments have been added by different users. The most important 
ones are probably: 
• A coefficient, 𝜎,  attached to the first, attacker-effectiveness, term is a 
number between 0 and 1 indicating the scouting effectiveness of A in 
locating and targeting all of B’s forces. In practical application, a zero 
indicates an undetected enemy who will conduct a first attack before A 
can launch a salvo. Otherwise, most analyses assume full effectiveness 
with all enemy taken under fire. 
• A coefficient, 𝜏, attached to the second, defender-effectiveness, term is 
also a number between 0 and 1. A value of one indicates a fully ready 
defensive force, illustrated by the Israeli Sa’ar boats in the 1973  
Arab-Israeli War. A value of zero indicates complete surprise, illustrated 
by HMS Sheffield and USS Stark that failed to defend themselves. 
Another powerful insight is how to reflect the state of training of a warship. We 
believe that one simply adds a coefficient to the first and second terms in the numerator, 
both numbers taking values between zero and one. It tells the fleet that insofar as combat 
readiness is concerned, training effectiveness involves only two things: full readiness to 
attack the enemy, and full readiness to defend the ship by all means available. This seems 
a straightforward and valuable insight. One might argue that a damage control training 
coefficient belongs next to 𝑎1 in the denominator. As a former Damage Control Assistant, 
author Hughes does not think so. Staying power is a measure of how much ordnance it 
takes to put the ship out of action, not to sink it, and damage control is principally 
concerned with keeping a crippled ship afloat or, after a period often measured in hours, 
restoring it to combat ready status. 
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The reader should not infer that the equations have much power to predict the 
outcome of a future engagement. The power comes from the general conclusions, such as 
those in Chapter II, which can be determined by parametric analysis. On the other hand, 
many efforts have been quite important and valuable in determining how well the 
equations “predict” actual results of past battles when the two forces are known ex post 
facto, as well as who fired first and with how many missiles—what is called the model 
validation process in the jargon of operations research. It would take a lengthy discourse 
to describe the tests and their results in detail, but it is fair to say when departures 
occurred between “predicted” and actual outcomes, the differences could be explained. 
None of the tests challenged the major conclusions of parametric analysis, e.g., that force 
numbers are the most important single property of a fleet in combat, and that running out 
of defensive firepower is a significant concern for a fighting force. 
A. SELECT SALVO EQUATION TESTS, APPLICATIONS, AND 
EMBELLISHMENTS 
LT Thomas R. Beall, USN, “The Development of a Naval Battle Model and Its 
Validation Using Historical Data” (Master’s thesis, NPS, March 1990). Data from 14 
historical naval battles were gathered to compute model input parameters for the 
opposing forces and their interactions. Salvo model results were compared with historical 
outcomes. The conclusion is that a salvo model is a fair representation of reality. But the 
after-the-fact “predictive power” of this or other combat models he tests depends on 
knowing the actual input parameters for the battle after the battle is over, so that its actual 
facts, e.g., open and cease fire times, can be used as inputs. 
LT Jeffrey R. Cares, USN, “The Fundamentals of Salvo Warfare” (Master’s thesis, NPS, 
March 1990). Cares used the then-popular Naval Tactical Game (NAVTAG) war game 
as “the real world” and compared simulation results with salvo equation results. He 
arrived at conclusions similar to T. R. Beall’s. To help understand the differences 
between salvo model predictions and simulation outcomes for identical inputs, Cares 
usefully defines and applies concepts like “combat entropy” and “the sump effect.” 
LT Epaminondas Hatzapoulos, Greek Navy, “A Modern Naval Combat Model” 
(Master’s thesis, NPS, September 1990). In addition to amplifying the salvo equations as 
validated by Beall and Cares, the thesis shows how to introduce human factors that affect 
combat outcomes, namely alertness, leadership, morale, and training. 
LT Ray L. Snell, USN, “Countertargeting in Modern Naval Combat” (Master’s thesis, 
NPS, March 1991). The first adaptation of the salvo model for exploring air attacks on 
warships. Explores the effect of jamming and decoys on aircraft attack effectiveness 
quantitatively, aided by the RESA wargaming system. 
LT Timothy T. Smith, USN, “Combat Modeling Low Intensity Conflict Anti-surface 
Warfare for Engagement Analysis” (SECRET Master’s thesis, NPS, March 1991). 
Examines the threat of missile-carrying FPBs to shipping in coastal waters escorted by 
FFG-type surface combatants. The results are classified, but the unclassified conclusion 
emphasizes the importance of outscouting the FPB enemy in order to attack him 
effectively first. 
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Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “The Value of Warship Attributes in Missile Combat,” NPS 
Technical Report, NPS-OR-93-001, October 1992. Traces the evolution of force-on-force 
combat at sea since 1900 and the parallel need to evolve different models. With 
parametric analysis alone, reaches important conclusions, some of which are described in 
Chapter II. 
LCDR Dimitrios Sakellariou, Greek Navy, “The Effect of Staying Power on Offensive 
and Defensive Power of a Modern Warship” (Master’s thesis, NPS, March 1993). 
Determines the nonlinear quantitative relationships between offensive power, defensive 
power, and staying power. 
LT Adrianos M. Poulos, Greek Navy, “An Anti-air Warfare Study for a Small Size 
Navy” (Master’s thesis, NPS, March 1994). Uses the salvo equations to reach practical 
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APPENDIX B. REAL AND IMAGINED USS CUSHINGS  
IN HISTORY 
Designator Years of Service Displacement Speed Crew Principal Weapons 
TB-1 1890-1920 120 tonsFL 23 kts 22 3 torpedoes, two guns 
Served in the Cuba blockade in 1898, operating out of Key West. 
DD-55 1915-1936 1,200 tonsFL 28 kts 98 8 torpedoes, four 4-in guns 
Served on the East Coast, Irish Coast, and French Coast before returning to New York after 
World War I. 
DD-376 1936-1942 1,500 tonsSTD 36 kts 158 12 torpedoes, four 5-in guns 
Served across the Pacific, including the search for Amelia Earhart in 1937. Sunk in the First 
Night Battle of Guadalcanal, 13 November 1942. Lost: 70 officers and men. 
DD-797 1944-1947 2,300 tonsSTD 38 kts 273 10 torpedoes, five 5-inch guns 
Commissioned in 1944, served in Western Pacific, mothballed, and recommissioned for the 
Korean War. 
DD-797 1951-1960 2,900 tonsFL 35 kts same 5 torpedoes, five 5-inch guns 
Sailed from San Diego to Norfolk, Norfolk to Korea, and returned around the world. Then 
operated in the Mediterranean, in an Atlantic Hunter-Killer (HUK) Group, etc. Sold to Brazil 
in 1961, renamed Parana D-29, scrapped in 1982. 
DD-985 1979-2005 9,200 tonsFL 32 kts 334 6 Harpoons, two 5-in guns51 
USS Spruance, name ship of the class, was designed to displace 8,100 tons, but with room for 
growth. USS Cushing carried Tomahawk land attack missiles and Kevlar armor was added to 
protect vital places. She was the last Spruance to be decommissioned. 
Imaginary Missile Combatants 
“Streetfighter” 200052 1,200 tons ?? ?? Harpoons, RAM, soft kill, decoys 
“Cushing 1” 1985-2000 800 tons 32 kts 60 8 Harpoon 2s 
Cushing is the name ship of the class that destroyed the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet in the 
imaginary Second Battle of the Nile, 1 August 1998. It also “fought” in the “Battle of  
the Aegean.” 
“Cushing 2” not yet built 500 tons 30 kts 12 or 
24 
8 ASCMs, 57mm gun, soft kill 
Note:  “FL” = full load displacement; “STD” = standard displacement. 
  
                                                 
51 Plus 2 CWISs, 8 ASROCs, 6 torpedo tubes with reloads, 8 Sea Sparrows, 1 RAM launcher, 2 SH-60s. 
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